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IF THEY ASK FOR A STOOL . . . RECOGNIZING REASONABLE 
ACCOMMODATION FOR EMPLOYEES “REGARDED AS” 
DISABLED1 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 19902 (“ADA”), having reached its 
fifteen-year anniversary, has come to a crossroads in American society.  At its 
inception, Senator Edward Kennedy heralded it as “an Emancipation 
Proclamation and a Bill of Rights”3 for some forty-three million disabled 
Americans.4  Today, most everyone would agree that its stated purpose, “to 
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities,”5 is still a noble and 
necessary aim.  However, the actual practice of implementing the ADA in the 
employment context, and the resulting litigation, have generated considerable 
controversy in our nation.6  Even if one is not disabled, anyone who has held a 
job or hired an employee can understand the tensions inherent in promoting 
equal employment opportunity by granting special status to individuals based 
on distinct characteristics such as race, gender, and disability.  Questions as to 
who qualifies as disabled, what constitutes discrimination, and how disabilities 
can be accommodated are still hotly debated in the courts and at the worksite.  
Many have even accused the ADA of facilitating frivolous litigation—allowing 
individuals with either minor physical or mental difficulties or no impairment 
at all to harass their employers.7 
 
 1. The phrase “if they ask for a stool” comes from a hypothetical reasonable 
accommodation request in the case of Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police 
Department, discussed in depth infra Parts III and IV.  380 F.3d 751, 776 n.19 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000). 
 3. ROBERT L. BURGDORF, JR., DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 43 
n.100 (1995). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2000). 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). 
 6. See Litigating the Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Rural Enterprise, Agriculture, & Technology of the Committee on Small Business, House of 
Representatives,108th Cong. 1 (Apr. 8, 2003), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_house_hearings&docid=f:92589.pdf. 
 7. See id. at 2.  Employer advocates have argued that the ADA has allowed workers to 
obtain unjustified exemptions from generally applicable work rules.  Samuel R. Bagenstos, 
Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 399 (2000).  Disability rights 
activists, on the other hand, have asserted that courts have imposed an inappropriately restrictive 
definition of “disability” under the ADA in order to dismiss ADA claims at the summary 
judgment stage. Id.  See generally Charles B. Craver, The Judicial Disabling of the Employment 
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Much of this debate has sprung out of the differing interpretations given to 
the ADA’s often ambiguously broad statutory language.8  Specifically, the 
definition of “disability,” and the employer’s obligations to those so disabled, 
have sparked a split in the federal circuits.  The ADA’s definition of 
“disability” covers more than just individuals with a commonly recognized 
disability.  It also includes individuals “regarded as” disabled by their 
employers—in other words, individuals who are discriminated against based 
solely on misperception.9  For example, an employee who has lost weight and 
develops a skin rash on his face is (mistakenly) rumored around the workplace 
to have AIDS.  His manager fires him based on the misperception that he has 
AIDS.  This employee is “disabled” under the ADA, even though he has no 
actual disability.  The ADA provides that an employee with a “disability” is 
entitled to a “reasonable accommodation” from his or her employer if one is 
necessary to perform the essential functions of the job.10  The circuit split has 
arisen over whether those only regarded as disabled, like the employee in the 
above example, should have the right to this reasonable accommodation. 
In 1996, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held, without analysis, that a 
regarded as disabled employee is entitled to reasonable accommodation.11  
Subsequently, the Courts of Appeal for the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits reached the opposite conclusion, broadly denying reasonable 
accommodation under any circumstances.12  Only the Eighth and Ninth Circuit 
Courts explained their holdings, asserting that such a rule prevents the 
“bizarre” result of forcing employers to accommodate non-existent 
disabilities.13 
 
Discrimination Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 18 LAB. LAW. 417 (2003); 
Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. CR.-
C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999).  One commentator has noted that the ADA’s definition of disability is so 
vague that it “demands value judgments that even the most committed textualist cannot avoid.”  
Bagenstos, supra, at 400–01.  The same commentator has also examined, with alarmingly 
ambiguous results, the growing accusation that because of these problems the ADA actually has 
diminished employment for the disabled.  Samuel R. Bagenstos, Has the Americans with 
Disabilities Act Reduced Employment for People with Disabilities?  25 BERKELY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 527 (2004) (reviewing THE DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A 
POLICY PUZZLE (Darld C. Stapleton & Richard V. Burkhauser eds., 2003)). 
 8. Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 399. 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (2000). 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
 11. Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 12. See Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1231–33 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999); Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 
907, 916–17 (8th Cir. 1999); Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998).  
Two other circuit courts have considered the issue but declined to address it.  See Cameron v. 
Cmty. Aid for Retarded Children, Inc., 335 F.3d 60, 64 (2nd Cir. 2003); Mack v. Great Dane 
Trailers, 308 F.3d 776, 783 n.2 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 13. See Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1231–33; Weber, 186 F.3d at 916–17. 
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In August 2004, the Third Circuit in Williams v. Philadelphia Housing 
Authority Police Department14 changed this tide of decision and held that the 
ADA does entitle regarded as disabled employees to reasonable 
accommodation.15  Following the reasoning of a 2002 New York District Court 
opinion,16 the Williams court cited the legislative history of the ADA, the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline,17 
and a practical view of the employment relationship as the foundations for its 
decision.18  Entitling regarded as disabled employees to reasonable 
accommodation, in the Third Circuit’s view, is consistent with the ADA’s goal 
of eliminating disability-based discrimination and also promotes an interaction 
between the employer and employee that is essential to disabuse employers of 
mistaken perceptions.19 
This Comment will examine both sides of this hotly contested judicial 
debate and argue that courts should hold employers liable for failing to 
reasonably accommodate regarded as disabled employees.  This liability 
should be applied on a case-by-case basis consistent with the ADA’s plain 
language and intended goals of antidiscrimination and equal opportunity.  Part 
I lays out the statutory background of the ADA, analyzing its legislative 
history to determine the overall goals of the law.  Part II explains the pertinent 
provisions of the ADA in the contexts of their legislative history, relation to 
earlier disability rights legislation, applicable Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) regulations, and judicial interpretations.  Part III 
explores in detail the key opposing decisions of the Eighth Circuit in Weber v. 
Strippit, Inc.20 and the Third Circuit in Williams.  Part IV analyzes key 
situations in which reasonable accommodation will be at issue for those 
regarded as disabled.  Part V concludes that recognizing reasonable 
accommodation for perceived disabilities under certain conditions is consistent 
with a practical view of the employer–employee relationship and is essential to 
advance the ADA’s goals in this context. 
 
 14. 380 F.3d 751 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 1725 (U.S. 2005). 
 15. Id. at 772–76. 
 16. Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 17. 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
 18. Williams, 380 F.3d at 772–76. 
 19. Id. at 776 n.19.  Shortly before this Comment went to press, the Tenth Circuit expressly 
followed the Williams decision and explicitly held that “an employer must reasonably 
accommodate employees regarded or perceived as disabled.”  Kelly v. Metallics West, Inc., 2005 
WL 1332287, at *6 (10th Cir. Jun. 7, 2005). 
 20. 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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I.  STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
A. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
Arguably the most significant disability rights law prior to the ADA was 
the Rehabilitation Act of 197321 (“Rehab Act”).22  Having a detailed 
knowledge of the history and purpose of the Rehab Act is vital to formulating a 
correct understanding and interpretation of the ADA.23  The Rehab Act 
established a prohibition on discrimination against the disabled in programs or 
activities receiving federal financial assistance.24  As originally written, 
Section 504 of the Rehab Act specifically prohibited employment 
discrimination against any “otherwise qualified individual with handicaps” in 
any of these programs or activities.25 
To clarify compliance with Section 504, Congress expanded the definition 
of “handicapped individual” in 1974.26  The new definition read: “[A]ny 
person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits 
one or more of such person’s major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an 
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such impairment.”27  This 
amendment to Section 504 indicated “Congress’[s] concern with protecting the 
handicapped against discrimination stemming not only from simple prejudice, 
but also from ‘archaic attitudes and laws.’”28  It also evidenced Congress’s 
intent “to preclude discrimination against ‘[a] person who has a record of, or is 
 
 21. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
Title 29 of the U.S.C.).  The sections of the Rehab Act that pertain to employment and business 
opportunities for the disabled are contained in 29 U.S.C. §§ 705, 791–794e (2000).  See 
BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 584–89. 
 22. BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 39. 
 23. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998) (stating that “[t]he ADA’s definition of 
disability is drawn almost verbatim from the definition of ‘handicapped individual’ included in 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . .”).  The ADA explicitly refers to the Rehab Act: “Except as 
otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser 
standard than the standards applied under . . . the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . or the regulations 
issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.” 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2000); Bragdon, 524 
U.S. at 631–32 (citing and following this provision with regard to the Rehab Act’s regulations) 
(citations omitted).  Section 504 of the Rehab Act “has served as both the testing ground and 
launch-pad for . . . the concepts and principles” of the ADA.  BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 43. 
 24. 29 U.S.C. § 794; BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 37. 
 25. BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 39 (quoting Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394 (1973) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a))). 
 26. Id. at 128. 
 27. School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 278–79 (1987); BURGDORF, 
supra note 3, at 128 (quoting Pub. L. No. 93–516, § 111(a)(6), 89 Stat. 2–5 (1974) (codified at 29 
U.S.C. § 706(8)(B))). 
 28. Arline, 480 U.S. at 279 (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-1297, at 50 (1974), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6400). 
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regarded as having, an impairment [but who] may at present have no actual 
incapacity at all.’”29 
The general purpose of Section 504 of the Rehab Act, and especially its 
subsequent amendments, is to prohibit employers from discriminating against 
disabled individuals.30  Congress generally patterned Section 504 after Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“CRA”), which prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, or nation origin in federally assisted programs.31  The CRA 
had a proven ability to require federal programs, and private employers 
(through Title VII), to hire minorities.32  By directly prohibiting adverse 
actions by employers on the basis of race, the CRA indirectly encouraged the 
racial integration of employment in America.33  Congress sought to utilize this 
function to aid the disabled.34  By directly prohibiting adverse actions against 
the disabled in Section 504, Congress would indirectly foster the integration of 
the disabled into federally funded programs and fight the “‘irrational fears or 
 
 29. Id. (quoting Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405–06 n.6 (1979)).  The 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”) issued implementing regulations in 
1977, detailing an exact definition of Section 504’s “physical impairment” that included “any 
physiological disorder . . . cosmetic disfigurement or anatomical loss affecting” a number of the 
body’s systems.  45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (2004); see Arline, 480 U.S. at 280.  The regulations 
also defined “major life activities” as “functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual 
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”  45 C.F.R. § 
84.3(j)(2)(ii); see Arline, 480 U.S. at 280.  Because of judicial reliance on these definitions, they 
became vital to determining the meaning of “regarded as” disabled in the Rehab Act.  See Arline, 
480 U.S. at 280–83.  To be considered regarded as disabled under Section 504, an employee must 
be viewed by his employer as having an impairment limiting a major life activity within the scope 
of these definitions.  See id. at 278–80. 
 30. BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 39.  Congress’s 1978 amendments to the Rehab Act 
extended its coverage to federal executive agencies and the U.S. Postal Service.  Id.  The 1992 
amendments replaced the original term “handicapped” with “disabled,” in line with the recently 
enacted ADA’s terminology.  Id. at 17, 584. 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2000); Arline, 480 U.S. at 277–78.  Section 504 has its origins in 
attempts by Congressmen Humphrey and Vanik to amend Title VI to add disability to the list of 
prohibited grounds for discrimination.  BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 26–27, 39. 
 32. See Robert D. Loevy, The Impact and Aftermath of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION 334 
(Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997). 
 33. See id. 
 34. Both Senator Humphrey and Representative Charles Vanik testified that their intent to 
add a disability provision to Title VI of the CRA had been fulfilled by Section 504’s passage.  
BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 40.  Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
Representative Vanik’s “remarks constitute a ‘primary signpost on the road toward interpreting 
the legislative history of § 504.’”  Arline, 480 U.S. at 282 n.9 (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 
U.S. 287, 295 n.13 (1985)); see Loevy, supra note 32, at 348–49 (labeling the Rehab Act and 
ADA as “subsequent laws . . . that expanded and further defined the scope” of the CRA). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
932 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:927 
prejudice . . . of employers or fellow workers.’”35  A primary way the Rehab 
Act achieved this goal was through the requirement (established by regulatory 
and judicial interpretation of Section 504) that employers give reasonable 
accommodations to disabled workers.36  These same motivations and methods 
of enforcement eventually formed the bedrock for one of the most expansive 
nondiscrimination laws our country has seen—the ADA. 
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
In the late 1980s, disability rights groups pressured Congress to pass new 
legislation that would solidify judicial interpretations of the Rehab Act and 
expand its nondiscrimination mandate to all business entities.37  The 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”)’s National Council 
for the Handicapped (now called the National Council on Disability)38 
published a report to the White House and Capitol Hill in 1986, which 
recommended that “Congress . . . enact a comprehensive law requiring equal 
opportunity for individuals with disabilities, with broad coverage and setting 
clear, consistent, and enforceable standards prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of handicap.”39  “The Council even suggested a name for the proposed 
statute—the Americans with Disabilities Act.”40  Congress introduced the 
 
 35. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284 n.13 (quoting Senator Hubert Humphrey’s remarks on the Senate 
Floor in 1977). 
 36. See id. at 287 n.17 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1985), currently codified in the Rehab 
Act as 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2000)). 
 37. Despite the recognized desirability of the Rehab Act’s essential goals and requirements, 
it was criticized for problems with inconsistent judicial interpretation, enforcement, and primarily 
its limited scope of coverage.  BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 44; see, e.g., Note, Employment 
Discrimination Against the Handicapped and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on 
Legal Evasiveness, 97 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1984); Janet A. Flaccus, Discrimination Legislation 
for the Handicapped: Much Ferment and the Erosion of Coverage, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 81 (1986).  
For example, “reasonable accommodation” was not explicitly written into the statute, and it only 
covered entities with direct federal connections.  BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 44.  Amending the 
CRA was again considered, but this method, it was ultimately decided, would be insufficient to 
explicitly address the specific aspects of disability-based discrimination, such as the need for 
reasonable accommodation and the removal of architectural barriers.  Id. (citing NATIONAL 
COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE A-35-A-39 (app.) (1986) [hereinafter 
TOWARD INDEPENDENCE]).  In pushing for this new legislation, a major goal of the disability 
rights movement was to “eliminate the attitudes and practices that exclude people with actual, 
past, or perceived impairments from opportunities to participate in public and private life.”  
Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 426. 
 38. This Council was created and placed under the HEW by Congressional mandate as part 
of a Rehab Act amendment in 1978.  Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Historical Background of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 387, 390 (1991). 
 39. BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 45 (quoting TOWARD INDEPENDENCE, supra note 37, at 
18). 
 40. Id. at 45 (quoting TOWARD INDEPENDENCE, supra note 37, at 18). 
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ADA bill in the 101st Congress in 1989.41  After substantial debate in both the 
House and Senate, and negotiations with the Bush Administration, Congress 
passed the final version of the ADA on July 13, 1990, and President George 
Bush signed it into law thirteen days later on July 26.42  The ADA extends 
disability-based discrimination prohibitions to the private sector, including all 
employers, pursuant to Congress’s powers to regulate commerce and enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment.43 
The express purposes of the ADA are “(1) to provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities; [and] (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, 
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities . . . .”44  Congress also listed several findings to provide a factual 
foundation for the ADA.45  Of particular importance for this present study: 
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with 
disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive 
social problem; 
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical 
areas as employment . . . 
(7) individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have 
been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment . . . based on characteristics that are beyond the 
control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not 
truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, 
and contribute to, society . . . 
(9) the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and 
prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an 
equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is 
 
 41. Provisions were redrafted to add greater specificity to the statutory language, and some 
requirements, such as those relating to architectural accessibility, were reduced.  Id. at 46. 
 42. Id. at 47.  The House passed the ADA by a vote of 377 to 28.  Id.  The Senate passed it 
by a margin of 91 to 6.  Id. 
 43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b)(4), 12111(2) (2000).  Commentator Robert Burgdorf stated: “The 
ADA has the broadest scope of coverage of any single civil rights measure enacted to date, with 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 being the only statute even comparable in the breadth of its 
nondiscrimination coverage.”  BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 53.  Congress has authority to 
regulate interstate commerce and enforce antidiscrimination in the states via powers granted to it 
by the U.S. Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; id. amend. XIV, § 5.  Essentially all employers, 
private or public, fall under these powers, and thus so does the ADA itself.  See BURGDORF, 
supra note 3, at 53–54. 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)–(2). 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a). 
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justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in 
unnecessary expenses resulting form dependency and nonproductivity.46 
Even a cursory reading of the ADA’s purpose and factual underpinnings 
reveals an attempt by Congress to encourage the integration of the disabled 
into American society by, first and foremost, eliminating discrimination 
against this class of people.47  It is also important to note that the 
Congressional findings specifically address the obstacle that discrimination 
based on “stereotypic assumptions” poses to the desired integration. 
Moreover, this “antidiscrimination-integrational” understanding of the 
ADA is reinforced by an appreciation of its connection with its predecessors, 
the Rehab Act and the CRA.48  The ADA explicitly provides that it offers at 
least as much protection to disabled individuals as provided under the Rehab 
Act and that Act’s enforcement regulations.49  The Congressional debate on the 
ADA also shows a clear connection between the nondiscrimination focus of 
the three acts.50  Reflecting on the ADA’s passage, Senator Tom Harkin, chief 
 
 46. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(2)–(3), (7), (9) (emphasis added). 
 47. See generally Elizabeth Clark Morin, Note, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: 
Social Integration Through Employment, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 189 (1990).  Authors and Supreme 
Court Justices have recognized the importance of the ADA’s findings in interpreting the statute.  
See Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 418–19.  Justice Ginsburg has noted that the ADA’s findings 
provide “[t]he strongest clues to Congress’[s] perception of the domain of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.”  Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 494 (1999) (Ginsburg J., 
concurring); Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 419 n.79. 
 48. See 1 GARY PHELAN & JANET BOND ARTERTON, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN THE 
WORKPLACE, 1-9 (2004) (stating: “The basic framework of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990 extends the scope of coverage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to persons with disabilities 
and incorporates the principles of nondiscrimination established in Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”). 
 49. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  Moreover, the remedies available under the 
ADA are the same ones afforded by Title VII of the CRA.  42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); 1 PHELAN & 
ARTERTON, supra note 48, at 1-9. 
 50. Senator Tom Harkin noted that the ADA adopted 
many standards and interpretations from the original HEW regulations implementing 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, including the obligation to provide a 
reasonable accommodation . . . [and] incorporates by reference the remedies set out in 
[T]itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which includes injunctive relief and limited 
back pay. 
135 CONG. REC. S10714, reprinted in THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT, 118 (G. John Tysse ed., 1991).  Senator Harkin also noted that preventing 
discrimination against disabled individuals under the ADA is akin to extending to them the 
protections the CRA provides to racial minorities.  135 CONG. REC. S10711.  Senator 
Durenberger, ranking member on the subcommittee for the handicapped, stated: “[I]n 1964, we 
passed civil rights protections based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . . [I]t is 
time to complete that commitment to individual rights . . . and add persons with disabilities to the 
list of those protected from unjust discrimination.”  135 CONG. REC. S10721. 
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sponsor of the ADA bill and chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on the 
Handicapped at the time,51 made a telling pronouncement: 
  The ADA . . . is not about giving something to people with disabilities.  It 
is about civil rights . . . . It is about breaking down barriers and opening doors 
of opportunity to bring all Americans with disabilities into the mainstream of 
American life . . . . Above all, the ADA is about one clear and forthright 
message: Discrimination has no place in America.52 
Through its drafting of the ADA and its supporting remarks on the floors of 
Capitol Hill, Congress expressed its intention that the ADA continue the 
mission of the CRA and the Rehab Act of promoting social integration, i.e. 
“equal opportunity,” through nondiscrimination.53 
While there are differences among the CRA, the Rehab Act, and the ADA, 
their unifying theme is undeniably the elimination of discrimination against 
 
Senator Kennedy remarked: “[The Civil Rights Act of 1964] helped bring about one of the 
greatest peaceful transformations in our history for millions of Americans who were victims of 
racial discrimination, and this legislation can do the same for millions of citizens who are 
disabled.”  135 CONG. REC. S10717.  Democratic Senator Cranston, a principal author of Section 
504 of the Rehab Act, stated: “[The ADA] would build on 16 years of successful experience with 
[S]ection 504 [of the Rehab Act] to eliminate disability discrimination in the private sector and all 
levels . . . of Government.”  135 CONG. REC. S10722.  Representative Martin of Illinois 
remarked: “[T]his legislation is important because it builds on the prohibitions against such 
discrimination which we enacted for recipients of Federal funds in the 1973 Rehabilitation Act.  
[The ADA] extends those protections throughout the private sector in employment . . . .” 136 
CONG. REC. H2411 (1990). 
 51. Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Foreword to 1 PHELAN & ARTERTON, supra note 48, at viii. 
 52. 138 CONG. REC. S24763 (1992), available at 1992 WL 221209. 
 53. Scott Burris and Kathryn Moss describe Title I of the ADA as serving two distinctive 
goals: “‘full participation’ . . . for individuals with disabilities . . . and the more limited purpose of 
eliminating discrimination in employment[,]” and they charge Congress with “elid[ing] the 
distinction” between the two in its stated purpose for the ADA.  Scott Burris and Kathryn Moss, 
A Road Map for ADA Title I Research, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT: ISSUES IN LAW, PUBLIC POLICY, AND RESEARCH 23 (Peter David 
Blanck ed., 2000) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101).  However, this seems to miss the connection 
between the two goals: Congress, using methods it employed in the CRA and the Rehab Act, 
could foster the integration of the disabled through the mechanism of employment 
antidiscrimination law.  Burris and Moss do concede that “Title I may contribute to meeting the 
goal of ‘full participation.’”  Id. at 23.  This, in the author’s view, is a sufficiently accurate 
statement of Congressional intent.  Through Title I, Congress meant in the first instance to give 
individuals a forum for claims of employment discrimination, thereby deterring discrimination 
against the disabled generally, thereby fostering an integration of the disabled into the workforce 
and greater society, i.e., “indirect integration through antidiscrimination.”  See John M. Vande 
Walle, Note and Comment, In the Eye of the Beholder: Issues of Distributive and Corrective 
Justice in the ADA’s Employment Protection for Persons Regarded as Disabled, 73 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 897, 933–34 (1998).  As Senator Harkin stated on the Senate floor in 1992: “Barring 
employment discrimination opens doors of opportunity . . . .” 138 CONG. REC. S24763 (1992), 
available at 1992 WL 221209.  Whether or not the statute has been successful in this goal over 
the past fifteen years, it remains its intended function. 
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protected classes.  The ADA must be understood to have the elimination of 
discrimination against the disabled as its chief objective, an objective designed 
to integrate the disabled into American society.  All specific provisions of the 
ADA should be read with this goal in mind. 
II.  PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE ADA 
The ADA’s nondiscrimination-in-employment requirement is as follows: 
“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a 
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job 
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, 
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and 
privileges of employment.”54  This requirement is easy enough to understand 
generally, but several of its terms like “disability” and “qualified individual” 
must be examined and defined in order to apply the statute to real-life 
scenarios.55  Furthermore, the complex issue of whether regarded as disabled 
employees should be entitled to reasonable accommodation is impossible to 
effectively understand and evaluate without a firm grasp of how the ADA’s 
network of terms allow a plaintiff to make this type of claim.  Perhaps just as 
important to this issue is discovering the source and rationale behind the 
ADA’s provisions. 
The authors of many law review articles on the ADA tend to assume that 
their readers already have this knowledge and proceed to gloss over the 
definitional material, or figure that the reader will gather the necessary 
knowledge from case synopses.  This Author finds both of these approaches 
wanting56 and, accordingly, will lead the faithful reader through the ADA 
provisions that bear directly on the issue at hand. 
 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
 55. As the EEOC has stated: 
Under other laws that prohibit employment discrimination, it usually is a simple matter to 
know whether an individual is covered because of his or her race, color, sex, national 
origin or age.  But to know whether a person is covered by the employment provisions of 
the ADA can be more complicated. 
A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, reprinted in DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION: EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED BY THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, at II-1 
(1998) [hereinafter EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE]. 
 56. The Author bases this opinion on two observations.  First, a complex statute like the 
ADA is not effectively understood from a mere statement, or a bare-bones definition, of its terms.  
One must effectively understand how the ADA works, and why Congress designed it this way, to 
objectively evaluate the issue of reasonable accommodation for the regarded as disabled, which is 
complex enough in itself.  Second, the courts’ statement of ADA law is often cursory and 
funneled towards the claim before the court.  In other words, courts are not usually concerned 
with painting a picture of how the ADA’s provisions interrelate, so much as they are interested in 
deciding the claim(s) at hand in the most efficient way possible.  Readers already intimately 
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A. Definition of Disability 
The most important (and most litigated) part of the ADA is its definition of 
“disability.”  It is the “gatekeeper” of the statute—to bring a suit under the 
ADA, an individual must first establish that she has a disability as defined 
under the statute.57  In other words, it is the first element of a prima facie case 
of discrimination under the ADA.58  “Disability” means: 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of 
the major life activities of such individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.59 
The first prong of this definition defines what courts have called an 
“actual” disability,60 but all three prongs equally and independently define the 
term “disability” under the ADA.61  The ADA’s statutory language does not 
define disability any further than this, though “physical impairment” and 
“substantially limits one or more major life activities” are essential terms for 
all three prongs of the definition and beg interpretation.  The EEOC has issued 
regulations interpreting these terms, much as the HEW did with the Rehab 
Act.62  The EEOC’s definition of “physical impairment” broadly includes 
essentially any internal physiological or mental disorder, cosmetic 
disfigurement, or anatomical loss, whether or not the condition affects an 
 
familiar with the ADA may wish to advance directly to Part III and refer back to this Part as 
necessary while proceeding through the case synopses or when evaluating the Author’s references 
to the legislative intent behind various provisions. 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 404. 
 58. Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (emphasis added).  This Article will not explore the “record-of” 
prong, save to explain that a person who has some record of having an impairment that 
substantially limited a major life activity, but is not currently so limited, qualifies under this 
prong of the definition.  An example of such a person would be someone who had cancer in the 
past but does not currently have it.  An employer who terminates this individual because of this 
record of cancer, perhaps because of fear it might return, would violate the ADA.  BURGDORF, 
supra note 3, at 151.  A person who has a record of an impairment that is misclassified as 
substantially limiting also qualifies.  Id. 
 60. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 762–
66 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing whether an individual is “actually disabled within the meaning of 
the ADA”). 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 494 (1999); 
Weber, 186 F.3d at 914. 
 62. Williams, 380 F.3d at 762–63.  While the ADA does not explicitly authorize the EEOC 
to issue implementing regulations (as the Rehab Act did with the HEW), Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480, 
courts have recognized their utility in interpreting the ADA’s provisions and have used them to 
this end.  E.g., Williams, 380 F.3d at 762 n.7; Weber, 186 F.3d at 912–13 (citing the EEOC 
regulations for interpretations of the ADA’s disability definition). 
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individual’s life.63  External conditions, such as “[e]nvironmental, cultural, or 
economic disadvantages,” are not impairments under the ADA.64  
Additionally, conditions that are “temporary, non-chronic[,] . . .  [or] of short 
duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact” do not qualify as 
impairments.65  Common, ordinary physical characteristics and personality 
traits within the “normal range” are also excluded from the impairment 
definition.66  For example, old age, eye or hair color, left-handedness, height, 
weight, muscle tone, quick temper, and poor judgment are not impairments 
(unless such are symptoms of an underlying physiological disorder or 
psychological disease).67  Next, to qualify as an actual disability, the 
impairment must substantially limit one or more major life activities.  The 
EEOC defines “major life activities” as “those basic activities that the average 
person in the general population can perform with little or no difficulty.”68  
Major life activities include “functions such as caring for oneself, performing 
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
working.”69  An individual with an impairment is “substantially limited” in 
performing a major life activity if the individual is: 
 
 63. The relevant regulations specifically define impairment as “[a]ny physiological disorder, 
or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more . . . body systems,” 
Labor, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2004), or “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as 
mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning 
disabilities.”  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2); Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 407.  These regulations are 
culled directly from the definition of “impairment” in the Rehab Act’s regulations.  See Public 
Welfare, 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2) (1977); Bagenstos, supra, at 407 n.29. 
 64. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(h); Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities, Social 
Cognition, and “Innocent Mistakes,” 55 VAND. L. REV. 481, 519 (2002). 
 65. Therefore, impermanent conditions like pregnancy, broken bones, concussions, sprained 
joints, appendicitis, or the common flu are not “impairments.”  29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 
1630.2(j); Travis, supra note 64, at 525. 
 66. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(h), (j); Travis, supra note 64, at 529. 
 67. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(h), (j); Travis, supra note 64, at 529.  Certain behaviors 
are explicitly not included as impairments under the ADA.  For example, current illegal use of 
drugs is not protected.  42 U.S.C. § 12210(a) (2000).  Homosexuality and bisexuality are 
explicitly noted as not being impairments under the ADA.  42 U.S.C. § 12211(a) (2000).  Also 
excluded are transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity 
disorders not resulting from physical impairments, other sexual behavior disorders, compulsive 
gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, and psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from 
current illegal use of drugs.  42 U.S.C. § 12211(b). 
 68. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(i). 
 69. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2004); Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 913–14 (8th Cir. 
1999).  This list is illustrative—not exhaustive.  Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639 (1998) 
(holding that human reproduction is a major life activity under the ADA); Weber, 186 F.3d at 
914.  Sitting, standing, lifting, reaching, and other analogous activities may also be considered 
major life activities.  Weber, 186 F.3d at 914; see Helfter v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 115 F.3d 
613, 616 (8th Cir. 1997).  Courts, thus, will consider if an activity is sufficiently similar to the 
EEOC’s representative list.  See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638–39.  “Working” itself has been 
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(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the 
general population can perform; or 
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which 
an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the 
condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general 
population can perform that same major life activity.70 
This determination must also take into account mitigating measures, such as 
medicines and assistive devices.71  For example, a person with eyesight 
problems that would otherwise constitute an impairment that substantially 
limits the major life activity of sight loses this status if the individual can wear 
eyeglasses that would correct this condition.72 
The EEOC’s regulations recognize that Congress adopted the definition of 
disability from the Rehab Act’s definition of the term “individuals with 
handicaps,” and, “[b]y so doing, Congress intended that the relevant caselaw 
developed under the Rehabilitation Act be generally applicable to the term 
‘disability’ as used in the ADA.”73 
1. “Regarded as” Disabled 
For an employee to be “regarded as” disabled, it follows that an employer 
must perceive that the employee has an impairment that substantially limits 
one or more major life activities, i.e., that the employee is actually disabled.  
The EEOC regulations lay out three situations where this can occur.  Under the 
ADA, an individual is regarded as having a disability if the individual: 
(1) [h]as a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit 
major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such 
limitation; 
(2) [h]as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life 
activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or 
 
determined by courts as a major life activity.  See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 
380 F.3d 751, 762–63 (3d Cir. 2004).  Being substantially limited in the major life activity of 
working is most often the last resort of a plaintiff who is not substantially limited in any other 
recognized category.  Vande Walle, supra note 53, at 902 (citing EEOC TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE, supra note 55, at § I-2.2(a)(iii)).  See infra notes 192–94 and accompanying text for 
a discussion of this major life activity in the context of the Williams case. 
 70. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1); Williams, 380 F.3d at 762; Weber, 186 F.3d at 913.  The 
nature, severity, and expected duration or impact of the impairment should be considered in 
determining if it causes an individual to be substantially limited in a major life activity, according 
to the EEOC regulations.  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). 
 71. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 487–89 (1999); Weber, 186 F.3d at 913. 
 72. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487–89. 
 73. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(g) (citing S. REP. NO. 116, at 21 (1989)). 
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(3) [h]as [no such impairment] but is treated by a covered entity as having a 
substantially limiting impairment.74 
The EEOC, in its Technical Assistance Manual, provides examples of all 
three scenarios.  An example of “(1)” would be where an employee had 
controlled high blood pressure that is not substantially limiting.75  If an 
employer reassigns the individual to less taxing work because of an 
unsubstantiated fear that the individual will suffer a heart attack performing 
strenuous work, the employer has regarded this employee as disabled.76  An 
example of “(2)” would be where an employer promotes an inexperienced new 
clerk to store manager instead of an experienced assistant manager who has a 
prominent facial scar.77  The employer did not think that customers would want 
to look at the scarred clerk.78  This action would be discriminatory because the 
employer perceived and treated the scarred clerk as a person substantially 
limited in the major life activity of working.79  An example given for “(3)” is 
as follows: assume that an employer fires an employee based on an (untrue) 
rumor that the employee has HIV.80  The employee, though having no 
impairment whatsoever, is thus discriminated against based on the employer’s 
erroneous perception.81 
These three categories should be seen as a guide to recognizing that 
employer misperceptions can result in discrimination in a variety of 
circumstances, and courts have used them to this end.82  The categories do not 
always define three fully independent scenarios.83  To the contrary, the lines 
separating the categories are not always clear-cut.84  Both “(1)” and “(2)” deal 
with circumstances in which an individual has a physical or mental 
 
 74. 29 CFR § 1630.2(l); Williams, 380 F.3d at 766.  The line separating these three situations 
are not always clear-cut, however, their common feature is that a person who does not have an 
actual disability is treated as having such disability.  BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 152. 
 75. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(l). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.; see infra notes 193–95 and accompanying text for an explanation of the major life 
activity of working. 
 80. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(l) (2004). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Dovala, 242 F.3d 967, 971 (10th Cir. 2001): 
  According to the EEOC’s interpretive guidelines, if an individual can show that a 
potential employer refused to hire her based on ‘myth, fear, or stereotype,’ including 
concerns regarding safety, insurance, liability, and acceptance by coworkers and the 
public, the individual will satisfy the ‘regarded as’ component of the definition of 
disability. 
Id. 
 83. BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 152. 
 84. Id. 
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impairment, but not one that substantially limits a major life activity.85  In both 
instances, an employer treats the individual as if she has a substantially 
limiting impairment.86  The difference between the two is that in “(1),” an 
employer overacts to the impairment, while in “(2),” the individual’s activity is 
truly limited as a result of attitudinal barriers.87  This distinction appears 
largely to be a matter of degree—the more the discrimination is based on 
societal stigma and wide-ranging prejudicial attitudes, the more akin the 
situation is to category “(2).”88  The more that the discrimination is an isolated 
overreaction to an impairment, the more clearly the situation fits in “(1).”89 
This interchange between the categories highlights commentator Robert 
Burgdorf’s observation that the categories “may serve to overcomplicate what 
is not, in fact, an inherently complex statutory concept.”90  The categories are 
derived, as much of the ADA has been, from the HEW’s regulations 
implementing Section 504 of the Rehab Act.91  While they are reiterated in 
some of the ADA’s legislative history,92 there is considerable evidence that 
Congress sought a more straightforward approach to the “regarded as” prong.93  
For instance, the report of the House Judiciary Committee asserted: 
[The “regarded as”] test is intended to cover persons who are treated . . . as 
having a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life 
activity.  It applies whether or not a person has an impairment, if that person 
was treated as if he or she had an impairment that substantially limits a major 
life activity.94 
Under this approach, a person who is treated as having a substantially limiting 
impairment is covered under the “regarded as” prong, regardless of any fine 
distinction about whether the coverage is due to mistake, overestimated 
impairment, or limitations resulting from the attitudes of others.95 
 
 85. Id. at 153. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 153. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 154. 
 91. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv) (2004); BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 154. 
 92. BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 154; see H.R. REP. NO. 101–485 (III), at 29 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 452 [hereinafter House Judiciary Committee Report]. 
 93. BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 154. 
 94. Id. (quoting House Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 92, at 452). 
 95. Id.  Instead of employing the three categorical distinctions, the Supreme Court in Sutton 
simply looked at whether the employer perceived the plaintiffs as having an impairment that 
substantially limited them in the major life activity of working.  Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999); see infra notes 192–94 and accompanying text for the Third Circuit’s 
implicit adoption of this approach.  One possible way of understanding and applying the 
“regarded as” prong and its regulations is first to use this more straightforward approach to 
determine coverage under the prong.  Once an employee is so determined, then look at which 
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The purpose of the “regarded as” prong, as expressed by Congress in the 
ADA’s legislative history, comes from the Supreme Court’s ruling in School 
Board of Nassau County v. Arline.96  In Arline, a schoolteacher claimed that 
her school had fired her based on its misperception that her contagious—but 
asymptomatic—tuberculosis constituted a handicap.97  The Court ruled that she 
did have a valid claim under the “regarded as” classification and, in this 
context, discussed the reasoning behind the “regarded as” prong.98  Congress 
adopted the Supreme Court’s analysis of the “regarded as” definition (under 
the Rehab Act) in introducing the ADA.  Congress explained: 
[The objective of the “regarded as” provision of the ADA] was articulated by 
the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline. The Court 
noted that although an individual may have an impairment that does not in fact 
substantially limit a major life activity, the reaction of others may prove just as 
disabling. “Such an impairment might not diminish a person’s physical or 
mental capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially limit that person’s 
ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of others to the 
impairment.” 
  The Court concluded that, by including this test, “Congress acknowledged 
that society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases are 
as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual 
impairment.” 
  Thus, a person who [suffers an adverse employment action] because of the 
myths, fears and stereotypes associated with disabilities would be covered 
under [the “regarded-as” prong], whether or not . . . the person’s physical or 
mental condition would be considered a disability under the first or second part 
of the definition.99 
 
regulatory category the employee most closely falls under in order to formulate a remedy for the 
specific nature of the discrimination (i.e., broad prejudicial attitude vs. individual overestimation 
of impairment).  This approach, as of now, has not been explicitly adopted by the courts.  
However, it could be more effective in applying the ADA’s “regarded as” prong in accordance 
with its intended purpose.  Part IV, Section B, of this Article demonstrates how this approach 
may be utilized in a “regarded as” claim. 
 96. 480 U.S. 273 (1987); see Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 
774–75 (3d Cir. 2004); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(l) (2004). 
 97. 480 U.S. at 276–77. 
 98. Id. at 282–86.  The case was decided under the Rehab Act, so the Court employed that 
Act’s “regarded as” prong, which is identical to the ADA’s.  Id. at 277–78; see supra note 27 and 
accompanying text. 
 99. House Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 92, at 453 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis 
added); see Williams, 380 F.3d at 774.  Some courts have read this rationale to mean that only 
individuals who have impairments that are generally subject to societal myths, fears and 
stereotypes are covered under the “regarded as” prong.  See id. at 770 n.14; Travis, supra note 64, 
at 502 n.100.  This seems to be an overly restrictive reading of the legislative history.  The house 
report does not say that only a person who suffers an adverse action based on myths, etc. would 
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The Arline decision observed that a person’s ability to work could be 
substantially limited as a result of the negative reaction of others to the 
impairment.100  Congress’s express adoption of this reasoning for the ADA’s 
“regarded as” provision indicates that it intended not simply to deter 
discrimination in a prophylactic way, i.e., by holding employers liable for all 
discriminatory actions, discrimination against those actually disabled will 
decrease.101  Congress was attempting to go one step further.  It recognized that 
discriminatory attitudes and actions can create tangible limitations—limitations 
that can, in and of themselves, substantially limit an employee’s ability to 
work.102  The example of the store clerk with the facial scar illustrates such a 
situation.103  The discriminatory attitude of the store clerk’s employer, in 
essence, turned the clerk’s scar into a substantially limiting impairment.  This 
legislative record indicates that the “regarded as disabled” prong’s intended 
functions are twofold: it should (1) penalize employers who take 
discriminatory actions (as defined by the ADA), regardless of whether an 
employee has an actual disability, and (2) attack discriminatory attitudes that 
hinder an employee’s ability to work, as in the case of the scarred clerk. 
In summary, the “regarded as” provision springs, as so much of the ADA 
does, from the Rehab Act, its regulations, and its case law.  At its essence, this 
provision covers a person whose employer regards her as having a 
substantially limiting impairment.  It functions both as an additional deterrent 
to discriminatory actions against actual disabilities and as a way to attack the 
prejudices at the heart of such actions.  The EEOC implementing regulations’ 
three categories can be used as ways to define and apply this rationale, but, 
perhaps more effectively, they should be used to identify those situations when 
 
be covered.  As EEOC regulations and other legislative history highlight, an individualized 
overreaction to a specific impairment should be covered as well.  See supra notes 95–97 and 
accompanying text.  Other courts have adopted this viewpoint.  Travis, supra, at 503 n.105. 
 100. 480 U.S. at 283; 1 PHELAN & ARTERTON, supra note 48, at 4-108. 
 101. The “prophylactic” deterrent function is still a major purpose of the “regarded as” 
provision, and its importance should not be underestimated.  Vande Walle, supra note 53, at 933–
34; Michelle A. Travis, Leveling the Playing Field or Stacking the Deck?  The “Unfair 
Advantage” Critique of Perceived Disability Claims, 78 N.C. L. REV. 901, 995–96 (2000) 
[hereinafter Unfair Advantage] (“Broad protection of perceived disabilities helps prevent 
spillover discrimination by employers that might be willing to take a chance that a given 
individual they think is disabled might not actually be disabled under the technical terms of the 
ADA’s actual disability prong.  Although lawmakers generally do not cite this prophylactic 
benefit as a reason for including perceived disability protection in civil rights statutes, some 
courts are convinced that a strong prohibition against perceived disability discrimination helps 
deter discrimination against those with actual disabilities.”) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted); Michael D. Moberly, Letting Katz Out of the Bag: The Employer’s Duty to 
Accommodate Perceived Disabilities, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 603, 640–41 (1998). 
 102. See Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 103. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
944 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:927 
discrimination itself becomes a substantially limiting impairment or turns an 
impairment into a substantially limiting one.104  Part IV will address how these 
last two situations may require special accommodations. 
B. “Qualified Individual” and “Reasonable Accommodation” 
Once an individual is determined either “actually disabled” or “regarded as 
disabled,” the individual must still be found “qualified” to be entitled to the 
ADA’s protection.  Thus a plaintiff must prove that she is a “qualified 
individual” as the second element of an ADA employment discrimination 
claim.105  This qualification requirement stems from Congress’s concern that 
the ADA not be construed to require the employment of those whose 
disabilities make it impossible for them to do their jobs.106  This concept is 
succinctly summed up by the accepted maxim that an employer “should not 
have to hire a blind bus driver.”107  So, the qualified individual inquiry ensures 
that refusing to employ someone because of that person’s inability to perform 
critical job tasks does not constitute discrimination.108 
The ADA defines a qualified individual as one who, “with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 
employment position that such individual holds or desires.”109  To determine if 
an individual falls under the coverage of this definition, courts have used a 
two-pronged inquiry suggested by the EEOC regulations.110  First, courts have 
examined whether the particular individual satisfies the “requisite skill, 
experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment 
position that such individual holds or desires.”111  Such requirements must be 
“job-related” and “consistent with business necessity,” as spelled out by the 
 
 104. See supra note 95. 
 105. Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 768 (3d Cir. 2004); Weber v. 
Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 106. BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 185.  The qualified individual requirement comes from the 
“otherwise qualified” language of Section 504 of the Rehab Act.  Id. at 188–89.  The National 
Council for the Handicapped argued in its original ADA proposal that the “otherwise qualified” 
concept was essentially redundant, because it is self-evident that a person who does not meet 
legitimate qualifications is not subject to discrimination.  Id. at 189.  Despite the non-inclusion of 
this requirement, Congress decided to again utilize the qualified individual concept in the final 
draft of the ADA, most likely “to allay fear of the unknown” among lawmakers and the business 
community.  Id. 
 107. Id. at 185. 
 108. Id. 
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000); Williams, 380 F.3d at 768; Weber, 186 F.3d at 916. 
 110. School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987) (analyzing 
under the analogous Rehab Act provisions); Weber, 186 F.3d at 916; Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 
142 F.3d 138, 145 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 111. Weber, 186 F.3d at 916 (quoting Deane, 142 F.3d at 145); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) 
(2004). 
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ADA’s statutory language.112  This first determination is used initially in order 
to weed-out complaints where plaintiffs fail to meet legitimate job 
requirements that are completely unrelated to disability.113  For example, the 
first step in examining whether an accountant with cerebral palsy is qualified 
for a certified public accountant job is to determine if the person is a licensed 
CPA, a requirement clearly job-related and consistent with business 
necessity.114  This first part of the inquiry has sometimes been referred to as 
finding if the employee is “otherwise qualified” for the job.115 
Second, courts have determined whether the individual, “with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 
employment position.”116  This determination is the crux of the qualified 
individual inquiry, as even if a requirement is job-related and consistent with 
business necessity, if a disabled person can meet it with a reasonable 
accommodation, she is a “qualified individual.”117  Thus, for both prongs of the 
inquiry, it is necessary to define what is meant by “essential functions” and 
“reasonable accommodation.” 
1. Essential Functions and Reasonable Accommodation 
To determine what constitutes the essential functions of a job, employers 
and courts are expected to take a factual, case-by-case look at each job 
situation, guided by the ADA’s statutory language and the EEOC 
regulations.118  The ADA explicitly provides that “consideration shall be given 
to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential” and that 
courts shall consider as evidence of essential functions an employer’s written 
job description, if prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for 
the job.119  The EEOC regulations define essential functions as “the 
fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a 
disability holds or desires.”120  If an employee can perform the essential 
 
 112. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6); BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 223; see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10. 
 113. See EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 55, at II-11. 
 114. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1172 (10th Cir. 1999); EEOC 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 55, at II-11. 
 115. See EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 55, at II-11.  This is not to be confused 
with the Rehab Act’s use of the term “otherwise qualified” for the entire two-pronged inquiry.  
See supra note 106. 
 116. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added); see Weber, 186 F.3d at 916 (quoting Deane, 
142 F.3d at 145); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). 
 117. See EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 55, at II-11; BURGDORF, supra note 3, 
at 222–23. 
 118. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(n); BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 215. 
 119. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 206. 
 120. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).  An example of an essential function for a secretary job would 
likely be typing, whereas a non-essential function for a secretary would likely be having the 
capability to lift heavy objects. 
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functions of a job (and is “otherwise qualified”), then that employee falls under 
the protection of the ADA. 
If an employee cannot perform the essential functions of the job on her 
own, her ADA claim is not ruined.  If she could do so with reasonable 
accommodation provided by the employer, her claim survives.121  If an 
employer fails to make such reasonable accommodations to the known 
physical or mental limitations of a qualified individual with a disability, it has 
discriminated in violation of the ADA.122  So the ADA requires employers to 
provide reasonable accommodations to disabled employees so that they can 
successfully perform the essential functions of their jobs.123  Courts have 
mostly applied this requirement by obliging employers to provide 
“operational” (or “traditional”) accommodations that restructure physical work 
environments or job functions to compensate for impairments.124 
The ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement comes from the HEW 
regulations issued pursuant to the Rehab Act.  These regulations introduced a 
“reasonable accommodation” requirement for federal programs under Section 
504.125  In order to not discriminate against a disabled individual, an employer 
has an affirmative obligation to give the individual reasonable accommodation, 
unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.126 
The Supreme Court recognized that the regulations’ reasonable 
accommodation requirement was key to enforcing Section 504’s non-
discrimination mandate.127  This requirement embodied a groundbreaking 
recognition that the unique nature of disability-based discrimination, as 
opposed to racial discrimination, necessitated that accommodations be made to 
 
 121. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
 122. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 123. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 124. See Unfair Advantage, supra note 101, at 906–07.  For examples of “traditional” 
accommodations, see id. at 913 n.41 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(o)(2)(i)–(ii) (identifying typical accommodations, including facility modification and job 
restructuring); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o) (listing other forms of reasonable 
accommodation, including “permitting the use of accrued paid leave or providing additional 
unpaid leave for necessary treatment,” and “[p]roviding personal assistants, such as a page turner 
for an employee with no hands or a travel attendant to act as a sighted guide to assist a blind 
employee on occasional business trips,” or “making employer provided transportation accessible, 
and providing reserved parking spaces”)). 
 125. Nondiscrimination on Basis of Handicap, 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676, 22,677 (May 4, 1977) 
(codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (2004)); BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 275. 
 126. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b); BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 275.  Such accommodation may 
include: “(1) [m]aking facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by 
handicapped persons, and (2) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, acquisition 
or modification of equipment or devices, the provision of readers or interpreters, and other similar 
actions.”  45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b).  See infra note 130 for the ADA’s definition of “undue hardship.” 
 127. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985); BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 277. 
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allow the disabled to work effectively.128  Otherwise, employers could simply 
claim that the disabled could not perform the job.  Congress later directly 
incorporated reasonable accommodation, in substantially similar form as the 
HEW regulations, into the statutory language of the ADA.129  The ADA 
defines reasonable accommodation as a term that may include: 
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and 
useable by individuals with disabilities; and 
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a 
vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, 
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or 
policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar 
accommodations for individuals with disabilities.130 
This example-centered definition, with the “and other similar 
accommodations” catchall, demonstrates that Congress intended reasonable 
accommodation to involve a flexible “fact-specific, case-by-case approach.”131  
Reasonable accommodation is basically a “modification or adjustment” of any 
 
 128. As the United States Commission on Civil Rights stated in a 1983 report: 
“Discrimination against handicapped people cannot be eliminated if programs, activities and tasks 
are always structured in the ways people with ‘normal’ physical and mental abilities customarily 
undertake them.  Adjustments or modification of opportunities to permit handicapped people to 
participate fully have been broadly termed reasonable accommodation.”  1 PHELAN & 
ARTERTON, supra note 48, at 8-2 (quoting U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING 
THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 102 (1983)); see also Unfair Advantage, supra note 
101, at 947–48. 
 129. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9); BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 278. 
 130. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).  An employer is not required to provide reasonable 
accommodation if such accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer.  
§ 12112(b)(5)(A).  The term “undue hardship” means an action requiring significant difficulty or 
expense, when considered in light of several factors laid out by Congress: 
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter; 
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of 
the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facility; the 
effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon 
the operation of the facility; 
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of 
a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and 
location of its facilities; and 
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, 
structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, 
administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered 
entity. 
§ 12111(10).  For instance, a small business in Minnesota would likely not be required to 
accommodate an employee who contracts a disorder that requires a warm living environment to 
live and work out of Florida. 
 131. BURGDORF, supra note 3, at 279. 
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type that is necessary to enable a disabled person to participate equally in the 
employment process.132 
The ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement adds to the law’s 
stated goal of anti-discrimination.133  It provides a unique way of preventing 
discrimination by granting a benefit not afforded to all workers equally—only 
qualified individuals with disabilities are entitled to reasonable 
accommodation.134  Accommodations are required for those disabled 
employees who need them to participate in the workplace with equal 
opportunity. 
III.  TAKING SIDES: WEBER AND WILLIAMS 
Perhaps the best way to ground in reality the preceding complex network 
of statutory definitions is to present how it played out in two cases before 
federal courts of appeal.  The Eighth Circuit in Weber v. Strippit, Inc.135 and 
the Third Circuit in Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police 
Department136 heard ADA claims in which the plaintiff attempted to prove that 
he had an actual disability and that his employer wrongly regarded him as 
disabled, a common “two bites of the apple” approach.137  The courts in these 
 
 132. Id.  The EEOC, in an attempt to lay out a “concise and proper” definition of reasonable 
accommodation, described the term thusly: 
(i) Modifications or adjustments to a job application process that enable a qualified 
applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such qualified applicant 
desires; or 
(ii) Modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or 
circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that 
enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that 
position; or 
(iii) Modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity’s employee with a 
disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other 
similarly situated employees without disabilities. 
Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2004)). 
 133. Congress stated that it is “central to the non-discrimination mandate of the ADA.”  Id. at 
279 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 39 (1990)); EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, supra 
note 55, at III-1 (“Reasonable accommodation is a key nondiscrimination requirement of the 
ADA because of the special nature of discrimination faced by people with disabilities.”). 
 134. See EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 55, at III-2. 
 135. 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 136. 380 F.3d 751 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 137. See WILLIAM D. GOREN, UNDERSTANDING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: 
AN OVERVIEW FOR LAWYERS 137 (2000) (recommending that lawyers “[p]lead disability and 
perceived disability in the alternative”).  For instance, if a plaintiff cannot meet the rigorous 
statutory standard of actual disability, he may turn to the “regarded as” prong to qualify him for 
ADA coverage.  The Third Circuit, for one, has noted that this approach is not inherently 
contradictory.  Williams, 380 F.3d at 766 n.10.  For example, a jury could either find 1) that an 
impaired plaintiff was actually disabled under the ADA or 2) that the impaired plaintiff was not 
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two cases have given the most lucid arguments, to date, for their respective 
positions on whether plaintiffs who are regarded as disabled by their employers 
are entitled to reasonable accommodation. 
A. Weber v. Strippit, Inc. (1999) 
The Eighth Circuit entered the fray over “regarded as disabled” reasonable 
accommodation claims in 1999 with its decision in Weber.  The case dealt with 
a sales manager, David Weber, suing his employer, Strippit, Inc., for allegedly 
firing him because of his heart disease.138  In the process of denying Weber’s 
claim that he met the ADA’s definition of disability, the Eighth Circuit ruled 
that “regarded as” disabled plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable 
accommodation.139 
In May 1990, Strippit, a manufacturer of tools and machinery used to 
manipulate sheet metal, hired Weber as an international sales manager.140  
After initial training at Strippit headquarters in Akron, New York, Strippit set 
up Weber to work out of his home in Minnesota.141  On February 2, 1993, at 
age fifty-four, Weber suffered a major heart attack.142  Weber entered intensive 
care and stayed there for about nine days, before being released under physical 
and work restrictions.143  Between 1993 and 1994, Weber returned to the 
hospital on numerous occasions for his heart disease, anxiety, hypertension, 
and related conditions.144  He continued to perform his job responsibilities 
during this period, however.145 
Beginning in October 1993, several months after Weber’s return to work 
following his second hospitalization, Strippit required Weber to complete more 
training and advised him that he might be relocated to Akron.146  Starting in 
May 1994, Strippit told Weber that he must relocate to Akron and eventually 
gave him an ultimatum: either go to Akron or stay in Minnesota and accept a 
lower-salaried position as a domestic sales engineer.147  Weber informed 
Strippit that his doctor advised him to remain in Minnesota for six months for 
 
disabled within the meaning of the ADA, but that her employer incorrectly viewed her as such.  
See id. 
 138. Weber, 186 F.3d at 910. 
 139. Id. at 912–15, 917. 
 140. Id. at 910. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Weber, 186 F.3d at 910. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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medical reasons prior to relocating.  Refusing to wait the six months, Strippit 
allegedly terminated Weber’s employment.148 
Weber filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of 
Minnesota, alleging (among other claims) that Strippit violated the ADA by 
firing him based on his disability, both actual and perceived.149  The district 
court granted Strippit’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on Weber’s 
actual disability claim but let Weber’s “regarded as disabled” claim proceed to 
a jury trial.150  The jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Strippit, and 
Weber appealed.151 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling 
denying Weber’s claim of actual disability on judgment as a matter of law.152  
Next, the Eighth Circuit considered Weber’s claim that the district court erred 
in not instructing the jury to decide whether Strippit violated the ADA by 
failing to reasonably accommodate Weber’s perceived disability.153  The court 
considered this issue in depth.  First, the Eighth Circuit determined that the 
district court correctly instructed the jury that in order to find that Strippit 
regarded Weber as disabled, it must find that Strippit perceived Weber to have 
an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.154  To prove his 
ADA claim of discrimination, the Eighth Circuit noted that Weber then needed 
to establish that he was a qualified individual, i.e., an individual who, with or 
without reasonable accommodation, could perform the essential functions of 
the employment position that he desired.155 
The Eighth Circuit conceded that the ADA’s plain language apparently 
entitles all plaintiffs who meet the definition of disability (either “actual,” 
 
 148. It was not clear to the court whether Strippit actually fired Weber or Weber abandoned 
his employment, but it took Weber’s allegations as true on Strippit’s motion for judgment as a 
matter of law.  See Weber, 186 F.3d at 910. 
 149. See id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 914.  The Eighth Circuit recognized, and Strippit conceded, that Weber’s heart 
disease constituted an impairment under the ADA.  Id. at 913.  However, the court concluded that 
his impairment did not rise to a level that substantially limited him in a major life activity.  Id. at 
914.  Weber conceded that he was not limited in the major life activity of working, as he 
continued to work for the majority of the time since his heart attack, but claimed that his heart 
disease substantially limited him in the major life activities of eating and walking.  Id. at 913.  
The court, however, found that Weber’s dietary restrictions and “difficulty walking long distances 
or climbing stairs without getting fatigued” constituted only moderate limitations on major life 
activities.  Id. at 914.  Thus, Weber’s heart disease did not substantially limit him in the major life 
activities of eating and walking—only moderately, which is not sufficient to meet the ADA 
standards for an actual disability.  Id. 
 153. Weber, 186 F.3d at 915–16. 
 154. Id. at 915. 
 155. Id. at 916. 
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“regarded as,” or “record of”) to reasonable accommodation.156  The court 
questioned the application of the statute’s plain language, however.  The court 
found that the reasonable accommodation requirement “makes considerably 
less sense” when applied to perceived disabilities than it does when applied to 
actual disabilities.157  The court commented: “Imposing liability on employers 
who fail to accommodate non-disabled employees who are simply regarded as 
disabled would lead to bizarre results.”158  Using the facts of this case, the 
court explained a possible bizarre result: If Weber’s heart condition prevented 
him from relocating to Akron, but did not substantially limit a major life 
activity, Strippit could fire him without incurring ADA liability.159  However, 
if Strippit mistakenly believed that Weber’s heart condition did substantially 
limit a major life activity, then it “would be required to reasonably 
accommodate Weber’s condition by, for instance, delaying his relocation to 
Akron.”160  The court found it bizarre to give Weber this accommodation for a 
non-disabling impairment, an accommodation that no “similarly situated 
employees would enjoy.”161 
The Eighth Circuit then turned to the (limited) previous caselaw on the 
issue, focusing primarily on the Third Circuit’s 1998 decision in Deane v. 
Pocono Medical Center.162  The Third Circuit en banc heard a claim from a 
nurse, Deane, who tore the cartilage in her wrist, missing nearly a year of 
work.163  Deane’s doctor released her to light duty but limited her lifting to 
under twenty pounds.164  Pocono Medical Center, Deane’s employer, 
determined that it could not accommodate her in any available position and 
fired her.165  Deane sued under a theory that Pocono regarded her as disabled 
and failed to reasonably accommodate her.166  The Third Circuit decided the 
case on other grounds but discussed the issue of reasonable accommodation for 
 
 156. See id. at 914–15. 
 157. Id. at 916.  The court stated that the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement is 
“easily applied in a case of an actual disability.”  Id.  An employer cannot fire an employee who 
suffers from an actual disability without first making reasonable accommodations that would 
enable the employee to continue performing the essential functions of his job.  Id.  The court 
described this provision as “perfectly consistent with the ADA’s goal of protecting 
individuals . . . who nonetheless can, with reasonable efforts on the part of their employers, 
perform the essential functions of their jobs.”  Id. 
 158. Weber, 186 F.3d at 916. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id.  at 917 (citing Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1996); Deane v. 
Pocono Med. Center, 142 F.3d 138, 148–9 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
 163. Weber, 186 F.3d at 917 (citing Deane, 142 F.3d at 141). 
 164. Id. (citing Deane, 142 F.3d at 141). 
 165. Id. (citing Deane, 142 F.3d at 141). 
 166. Id. (citing Deane, 142 F.3d at 142). 
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those regarded as disabled.167  The Weber court approvingly cited the Third 
Circuit’s arguments against accommodation: 
Among the court’s concerns were that adopting plaintiff’s interpretation of the 
ADA would: 
“(1) permit healthy employees to, through litigation (or the threat of litigation) 
demand changes in their work environments under the guise of ‘reasonable 
accommodations’ for disabilities based upon misperceptions; and 
(2) create a windfall for legitimate ‘regarded as’ disabled employees who, after 
disabusing their employers of their misperceptions, would nonetheless be 
entitled to accommodations that their similarly situated co-workers are not, for 
admittedly non-disabling conditions.”168 
The Eighth Circuit concluded that these arguments prove that Congress could 
not have intended to create a disparity in treatment among impaired but non-
disabled employees.169  The court ruled that “‘regarded as’ disabled plaintiffs 
are not entitled to reasonable accommodations.”170 
B. Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department (2004) 
As Weber noted, the Third Circuit had discussed reasonable 
accommodation for the “regarded as” disabled in its 1998 Deane decision 
without ruling on the issue.171  In Deane, it appeared that the Third Circuit was 
leaning against accommodation in the “regarded as” context.172  However, in 
2004, the case of Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police 
Department presented the Third Circuit a golden opportunity to rule directly on 
the issue, and it ruled in favor of accommodation.173 
Edward Williams was hired by the Philadelphia Housing Authority 
(“PHA”) as a police officer and worked for the PHA for twenty-four years.174  
In May 1998, after reporting for an evening shift in the PHA police 
department, Williams was requested to report to the sergeant’s office.175  After 
a superior officer confronted Williams about his “fractious” interactions with 
his fellow employees, Williams yelled and made multiple threatening 
remarks.176  The PHA immediately suspended Williams without pay.177  Later 
 
 167. Id. (citing Deane, 142 F.3d at 148–49 n.12). 
 168. Weber, 186 F.3d at 917 (quoting Deane, 142 F.3d  at 149 n.12). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See supra notes 163–69 and accompanying text. 
 172. Id. 
 173. 380 F.3d 751, 776 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 174. Id. at 756. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
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that evening, Williams called a psychological counselor and remarked, “I 
understand why people go postal.”178  A PHA officer who later spoke with the 
counselor testified that Williams talked of “smoking people, going postal, and 
having the means to do it.”179 
After the PHA directed Williams to return to work on an assignment in the 
department’s radio room, Williams instead began calling in sick on a daily 
basis.180  In June 1998, PHA ordered Williams to undergo a psychological 
examination with its own psychologist, Dr. Finley.181  In the meantime, 
Williams requested and received a medical leave of absence.182  In August and 
September, Williams saw Dr. Finley three times.183  Dr. Finley ultimately 
reported to the PHA regarding these visits that Williams should receive 
psychological treatment for depression and stress management, that for a three-
month period he should be assigned temporary duty during this treatment, and 
that he should not carry a weapon during this three-month period.184 
Williams thereafter made requests for temporary assignment to the PHA 
training unit and the radio room, neither of which were granted.185  Evidence at 
trial indicated that PHA’s refusal resulted from its belief that Williams’ 
diagnosis prevented him from working around armed police officers in the 
radio room because of potential access to firearms,186 despite a report from Dr. 
Finley that specifically stated Williams could work around firearms.187  In 
December 1998, PHA requested that Williams file for medical leave again, as 
all his leave was exhausted.188  Williams did not respond, and PHA fired 
him.189 
Williams filed a complaint against PHA in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania asserting an ADA employment 
discrimination claim based on both actual and perceived disability, among 
other causes of action.190  The District Court granted PHA’s motion for 
summary judgment, and Williams appealed to the Third Circuit.191 
 
 178. Williams, 380 F.3d at 756. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Williams, 380 F.3d at 756. 
 184. Id. at 756–57. 
 185. Id. at 757.  For the purposes of review of the district court’s summary judgment ruling, 
the Third Circuit court assumed the truth of Williams’ allegation that the PHA did not respond to 
his request for radio room duty, despite conflicting evidence.  Id. at 757 n.1. 
 186. Id. at 766. 
 187. Id. at 757. 
 188. Williams, 380 F.3d at 758. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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The Third Circuit first addressed Williams’ claim that PHA discriminated 
against him on the basis of actual disability.192  Specifically, Williams asserted 
that PHA refused to reasonably accommodate him and fired him based on his 
mental impairment—major depression—that substantially limited him in the 
major life activity of working.193  Williams contended that his mental condition 
prohibited him from carrying a firearm, which precluded him from working in 
a class of jobs in law enforcement.194  The court determined that a reasonable 
juror could find that Williams was (as compared to an average person living in 
the same geographical region and with similar abilities as Williams) 
substantially limited in his ability to perform jobs in law enforcement.195 
Next, the Third Circuit tackled Williams’ “regarded as” claim.  Williams 
argued that PHA erroneously regarded him as having a limitation that 
precluded him from having access to firearms or being around others carrying 
firearms.196  This, he contended, was a far greater limitation than what his 
 
 192. Id. at 761–62. 
 193. Williams, 380 F.3d at 758.  The EEOC has seen fit to address the major life activity of 
working directly in its regulations on the ADA.  The regulations provide, with respect to the 
major life activity of working: 
The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either 
a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average 
person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, 
particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of 
working. 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2004).  Several additional factors may be considered in this analysis: 
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access; 
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, 
and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, 
within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of 
the impairment (class of jobs); and/or 
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, 
and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or 
abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified 
because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes). 
§ 1630.2(j)(3)(ii).  The Supreme Court has summarized these regulations, holding that: 
[t]o be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, then, one must be 
precluded from more than one type of job, or a particular job of choice.  If jobs utilizing 
an individual’s skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not 
precluded from a substantial class of jobs.  Similarly, if a host of different types of jobs 
are available, one is not precluded from a broad range of jobs. 
Williams, 380 F.3d at 763 (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 493 (1999)). 
 194. Williams, 380 F.3d at 763–64.  The EEOC regulations pertaining to having a 
substantially limitation in the major life activity of working mention “a class of jobs” in its 
definition.  29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(i); see supra note 193. 
 195. Williams, 380 F.3d at 764. 
 196. See supra notes 180–87 and accompanying text for the purported factual basis of 
Williams’ allegation.  The court took special notice that a PHA administrator testified: 
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mental impairment actually presented, which was only that he could not carry a 
firearm himself.197  Building on its determination concerning Williams’ actual 
disability claim, the court found that the additional limitations perceived by 
PHA only served to further restrict the jobs Williams could perform in law 
enforcement.198  Thus, a reasonable trier of fact could find that PHA regarded 
Williams as being substantially limited in the major life activity of working, 
because of its perception that Williams could not hold effectively any law 
enforcement position.199 
The court then took up the issue of whether Williams was a “qualified 
individual” under the ADA.200  The court reiterated the fact that Williams 
requested a radio room assignment as a reasonable accommodation for his 
alleged disability.201  The court noted that the ADA specifically provides that 
“reasonable accommodation” includes “reassignment to a vacant position.”202  
PHA did not contest that Williams could have worked in the radio room 
without carrying a firearm and that vacant, funded radio room positions were 
available.203  Moreover, Williams alleged, and the record indicated to the court, 
that the radio room position was at or below the level of his former job and that 
he was qualified to perform the essential duties of the job.204  In the Third 
Circuit’s view, this showing was sufficient to establish that Williams was a 
qualified individual, when provided a reasonable accommodation, under the 
ADA.205 
This decision by the court opened the door to the controversial question: If 
a jury could find that Williams was not actually disabled but that PHA did 
regard him as disabled, may it find PHA liable for not accommodating his 
perceived disability?  In other words: Are “regarded as” disabled plaintiffs 
 
[a]t all relevant times, PHA assigned armed police officers to work in the PHA radio 
room.  Anyone assigned to the radio room would have access to firearms . . . PHA did not 
assign Sergeant Williams to the radio room . . . because . . . Sgt. Williams would have 
access to firearms in the radio room. 
Williams, 380 F.3d at 766. 
 197. Williams, 380 F.3d at 766–67. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 767. 
 200. Id. at 768. 
 201. Id.; see supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 202. Williams, 380 F.3d at 768 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000)).  The court 
acknowledged that the EEOC regulations suggest reassignment “‘should be considered only when 
accommodation within the individual’s current position would pose an undue hardship.’”  Id. 
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2004)).  However, neither party suggested that any 
accommodation would have been possible in Williams’ original position.  Id. at 768. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 770.  Here the court employed its previously devised burden for a plaintiff to show 
that a reassignment was reasonable under his specific circumstances.  Id. at 770 (citing Donahue 
v. Consol. Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 230 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
 205. Id. 
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entitled to reasonable accommodations under the ADA?  The Third Circuit met 
this question head-on in the next part of its Williams opinion.206 
The court prefaced its argument with the judicial history of the issue.  It 
noted that the First Circuit, in Katz v. City Metal Co.,207 and the “better-
reasoned” district court decisions had ruled that “regarded as” disabled 
employees are entitled to accommodation.208  The court also recognized that 
the Eighth Circuit, in Weber, and the Ninth Circuit, in Kaplan v. City of North 
Las Vegas,209 had refused to recognize accommodation for perceived 
disabilities.210  Summarizing both courts’ argument that applying the ADA as 
written would lead to “bizarre results,” the Third Circuit declined to reach the 
same conclusion in Williams.211  The court stated: 
  While we do not rule out the possibility that there may be situations in 
which applying the reasonable accommodation requirement in favor of a 
“regarded as” disabled employee would produce “bizarre results,” we perceive 
no basis for an across-the-board refusal to apply the ADA in accordance with 
the plain meaning of its text.  Here, and in what seems to us to be at least the 
vast majority of cases, a literal reading of the Act will not produce such results.  
Accordingly, we will remain faithful to its directive in this case.212 
The plain language of the ADA, as the court noted, does not distinguish 
between actually disabled and regarded as disabled employees in requiring 
accommodation.213 
Moving past the plain language of the ADA, the court further based its 
decision on a mix of legal and practical considerations.  The Third Circuit 
looked to the legislative history of the ADA and the Supreme Court’s decision 
in School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline.214  The court quoted 
 
 206. Id. at 772–73. 
 207. 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 208. Williams, 380 F.3d at 773 (citing Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 163–
71 (E.D.N.Y.); Jewell v. Reid’s Confectionary Co., 172 F. Supp. 2d 212, 218–19 (D.Me. 2001); 
Lorinz v. Turner Const., Co. 2004 WL 1196699, at *8 n.7 (E.D.N.Y May 25, 2004); Miller v. 
Heritage Prod., Inc., 2004 WL 1087370, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 21, 2004)).  Moreover, the Third 
Circuit expressly credited Judge Block’s analysis in Jacques as a blueprint for its own evaluation 
of this issue.  Id. 
 209. 323 F.3d 1226, 1231–33 (9th Cir. 2003).  This more recent decision will not be discussed 
in detail here, as it tracks Weber’s analysis and holding.  Id. (stating: “We find this [Weber’s] 
reasoning persuasive and agree with the Eighth Circuit’s analysis and holding.”). 
 210. Williams, 380 F.3d at 773. 
 211. Id. at 773–74. 
 212. Id. at 774.  The court did not proceed to make explicit why it thought the vast majority of 
the cases would not produce bizarre results.  For an analysis of why this assertion is likely 
accurate, see infra Part IV of this Article. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 774–75 (discussing Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 
(1987)); see supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text. 
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Congress’s statement of the rationale behind the “regarded as” provision, 
where Congress acknowledged that the perception of disability “may prove 
just as disabling” as actual disability.215  To the court, the wisdom of this 
conclusion was demonstrated here as, but for PHA’s erroneous perception that 
Williams could not be around firearms, he would have been eligible for a radio 
room assignment.216 
The Third Circuit also directly addressed the Arline decision, which dealt 
with a teacher plaintiff who had a contagious but not substantially limiting 
form of tuberculosis and sued the school board for firing her.217  The Supreme 
Court found that the teacher qualified under the “regarded as” provision of the 
Rehab Act and remanded the case, directing the district court to determine 
whether the school board could have reasonably accommodated her.218  The 
Williams court noted that the “regarded as” sections of both the Rehab Act and 
the ADA play a “virtually identical role” in each Act’s statutory scheme.219  
Additionally, the court cited the “well-established” rule that the ADA must be 
read to “grant at least as much protection as provided by . . . the Rehabilitation 
Act.”220  From this backdrop of legislative intent and Supreme Court directive, 
the “conclusion seem[ed] inescapable” to the Third Circuit that employees 
regarded as disabled are entitled to reasonable accommodation under the 
ADA.221  The court took note that neither the Eighth Circuit in Weber nor the 
Ninth Circuit in Kaplan addressed Arline.222 
Finally, the Third Circuit addressed the “windfall proposition” that Weber 
warned against.223  This windfall theory argues that providing reasonable 
accommodation to “regarded as” employees gives them a “windfall” 
accommodation that a similarly situated employee, not perceived as disabled, 
would not receive under the ADA.224  The Williams court argued that the 
record in this case demonstrates the weakness of the windfall theory.225  Here, 
contrary to its own psychologist’s opinion, PHA refused Williams a radio 
room assignment based on its erroneous perception that Williams’ 
psychological impairment not only prevented him from carrying a firearm, but 
 
 215. Williams, 380 F.3d at 774; see supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 216. Id. at 774. 
 217. Id. at 775; see supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id.; see supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 220. Williams, 380 F.3d at 775 (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998)); see 
supra note 22. 
 221. Williams, 380 F.3d at 775. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id.; see supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 224. Williams, 380 F.3d. at 775.  Ironically, the windfall theory was first suggested by the 
Third Circuit itself, in Deane v. Pocono Medical Center, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998).  See supra 
note 168 and accompanying text. 
 225. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 775–76. 
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that it further precluded him from even working around armed officers.226  The 
court emphasized that another employee with a similar impairment as Williams 
may well have received a radio room assignment, absent the misperception to 
which Williams was subjected.227  In simpler terms, “[t]he employee whose 
limitations are perceived accurately gets to work, while Williams is sent home 
unpaid.”228  Here, instead of providing a windfall, reasonable accommodation 
would remedy discrimination.229  To the court, “[t]his is precisely the type of 
discrimination the ‘regarded as’ prong literally protects from, as confirmed by 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Arline and the legislative history of the 
ADA.”230  Accordingly, the Third Circuit ruled that Williams, to the extent 
PHA regarded him as disabled, was entitled to reasonable accommodation.231 
C. Questions Raised by Weber and Williams 
The Third Circuit repudiated the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning and ruling in 
Weber, but only to a certain extent.  Boiled down to its essence, the Williams 
decision criticized Weber’s holding as over-broad and not applicable to the 
facts before the Third Circuit.232  Thus, a strict reading of Williams could 
confine its holding to these facts.  Important questions emerge, then, from the 
Williams decision: How do courts define when and where regarded as disabled 
employees are entitled to reasonable accommodation?  Which sets of facts 
invoke enforcement of the ADA’s plain language and which facts argue 
against it?  The focus of Part IV will be to examine several scenarios where 
these questions will be pressing and to provide reasoned answers. 
IV.  SITUATIONS WHERE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION FOR THOSE 
REGARDED AS DISABLED IS AT ISSUE 
As Williams asserted, it can be argued that there is already controlling 
Supreme Court precedent that recognizes reasonable accommodation for 
employees regarded as disabled.233  The Supreme Court in School Board of 
Nassau County, Florida v. Arline instructed the district court on remand to 
consider if reasonable accommodation should have been provided to the 
schoolteacher regarded as having substantially limiting tuberculosis.234  
Williams’ argument is persuasive in that the Supreme Court has recently held 
 
 226. Id. at 775. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See id. at 775–76. 
 230. Williams, 380 F.3d 775–76. 
 231. Id. at 776.  In April 2005, the Supreme Court denied PHA’s petition for certiorari, which 
challenged this ruling, without comment.  125 S.Ct. 1725 (U.S. 2005). 
 232. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 233. See supra notes 217–20 and accompanying text. 
 234. 480 U.S. 273 (1987); see supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
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that rights under the Rehab Act are recognized as the minimum protections 
afforded by the ADA.235  More specifically, however, the holding evidences 
the Court’s inclination, at least at the time of Arline, to allow a factual 
determination at the trial court level of whether reasonable accommodation 
should be afforded to those regarded as disabled. 
The Arline ruling cannot be seen as an unambiguous verdict on the issue, 
however.  The ruling, issued in 1987, gave no analysis or explanation as to 
why the regarded as disabled are entitled to reasonable accommodation, and 
there is no indication that the issue was raised by either party before the Court.  
It is still necessary then for lower courts to analyze the issue for themselves 
and come to a conclusion that is both legally and practically sound.  As this 
Part will argue, courts should generally apply the ADA’s language as written, 
i.e., recognize reasonable accommodation in the “regarded as” context, except 
in circumstances where a factual determination indicates that an inequitable 
consequence would result.236  This explains the Third Circuit’s conclusion that 
such a recognition could produce bizarre results, but likely will not in the 
majority of cases.  This recognition and case-by-case approach will best 
achieve the ADA’s primary, interrelated goals: (1) attack disability-based 
discrimination and (2) promote equal opportunity among the disabled.237  This 
Part will attempt to guide courts as to the types of scenarios where reasonable 
accommodation for “regarded as” individuals should or should not be 
recognized. 
 
 235. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 236. Commentator Michelle A. Travis has endorsed this principle by arguing that recognizing 
accommodation in this context is ill-served by an “all-or-nothing approach.”  Unfair Advantage, 
supra note 101, at 906.  However, Travis’s groundbreaking study focused primarily on the 
rationale behind disfavoring “traditional” accommodations for physically impaired, but not 
actually disabled, individuals.  This Part will cover this issue but will primarily seek to present a 
wider, concrete array of contexts in which reasonable accommodation is at issue for regarded as 
disabled employees (including claims involving hostile work environments and direct threats) and 
present additional legal bases for the right’s recognition (including the interactive process 
requirement and the dignitary interest rationale).  It may also be important to note that Travis’s 
article was published before Jacques and Williams made their key arguments in favor of 
accommodation.  For articles that endorse the Eighth Circuit view, that reasonable 
accommodation should not be recognized at all for perceived disabilities, see Jill Elaine Hasday, 
Mitigation and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 103 MICH. L. REV. 217, 267–68 (2004); 
Allen Dudley, Rights to Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
for “Regarded as” Disabled Individuals, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 389 (1999); Padmaja 
Chivukula, Is Ignorance Bliss?  A Pennsylvania Employer’s Obligation to Provide Reasonable 
Accommodation to Employees It Regards as “Disabled” after Buskirk v. Apollo Metals, Inc., 41 
DUQ. L. REV. 541 (2003). 
 237. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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A. Interactive Process Requirement 
As the District Court for the Eastern District of New York noted in the 
Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc. opinion: “[T]he ‘vast majority’ of courts . . . have 
held that employers have a mandatory obligation to engage in an interactive 
process with employees who may be in need of an accommodation for their 
disabilities.”238  This requirement is not explicitly provided for in the ADA but 
has been held to be inherent in the statutory obligation to offer reasonable 
accommodations to an otherwise qualified disabled individual.239  The ADA’s 
legislative history implies that an interactive process should occur with regard 
to accommodation, stating that in order to “identify possible 
accommodations . . . . [e]mployers first will consult with and involve the 
individual with a disability in deciding on the appropriate accommodation.”240  
The fact that the ADA has been held to mandate this interactive process is 
perhaps the best argument for holding employers liable when they fail to 
effectively consider reasonable accommodations for employees they regard as 
disabled. 
To enforce the Congressional intent behind the accommodation 
requirement, the EEOC has issued regulations regarding the interactive 
process: “[T]he employer must make a reasonable effort to determine the 
appropriate accommodation . . . . [This] accommodation is best determined 
through a flexible, interactive process that involves both the employer and the 
[employee] with a disability.”241  The interactive process can be triggered 
either by a request for reasonable accommodation by a disabled employee or 
by an employer’s recognition of the need for accommodation.242  Once 
 
 238. 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 
1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 535 U.S. 391 (2002)); see Barnett v. U.S. 
Air, Inc., 535 U.S. 391, 407 (Stevens, J., concurring) (opining that the Ninth Circuit held 
“correctly” regarding the interactive process and that this part of its decision “is untouched by the 
[Supreme] Court’s opinion”). 
 239. Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 168 (citing Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154,  
1172 (10th Cir. 1999)).  The EEOC regulations recognize that sometimes it will be immediately 
clear to both employer and employee what accommodation is necessary or that accommodation is 
impossible.  Taylor v. Phoenixville, 184 F.3d 296, 318 n.9 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (citing 29 
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (2004)).  In this event, the interactive process will not be necessary, 
but most likely some small level of interaction has still taken place. 
 240. Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 168 (quoting S.REP. NO. 101–116, at 34 (1989)). 
 241. Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 771 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting 
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9). 
 242. With regard to employer recognition, the EEOC has directed: 
An employer should initiate the . . . interactive process without being asked if the 
employer: 
(1) knows that the employee has a disability, 
(2) knows, or has reason to know, that the employee is experiencing workplace problems 
because of the disability, and 
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triggered, the EEOC has identified four critical steps that the employer should 
follow: 
(1) Analyze the particular job involved and determine its purpose and essential 
functions; 
(2) Consult with the individual with a disability to ascertain the precise job-
related limitations imposed by the individual’s disability and how those 
limitations could be overcome with a reasonable accommodation; 
(3) In consultation with the individual to be accommodated, identify potential 
accommodations and assess the effectiveness each would have in enabling the 
individual to perform the essential functions of the position; and 
(4) Consider the preference of the individual to be accommodated and select 
and implement the accommodation that is most appropriate for both the 
employee and the employer.243 
This process requires communication and good faith on the part of both 
employer and employee, and neither party may delay or obstruct the process.244  
 
(3) knows, or has reason to know, that the disability prevents the employee from 
requesting a reasonable accommodation. 
Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 169 (quoting EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE 
ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 
EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL at 5459 (1999)).  Moreover, courts have held that it is sufficient to 
trigger the process if the employer had enough information to be put on notice that the employee 
might have had a disability.  Id. (quoting Taylor, 184 F.3d at 314).  The Ninth Circuit noted in 
Barnett that nearly all the circuits have held that the interactive process is triggered by employee 
request or employer recognition.  228 F.3d 1105 at 1112, rev’d on other grounds, 535 U.S. 391 
(2002) (citing Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 952 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(“[W]hen the disabled individual requests accommodation, it becomes necessary to initiate the 
interactive process[.]”); Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1172 (holding that the duty to engage in the 
interactive process is triggered once the employee “convey[s] to the employer a desire to remain 
with the company despite his or her disability and limitations” and that “[t]he obligation to 
engage in an interactive process is inherent in the statutory obligation to offer a reasonable 
accommodation to an otherwise qualified disabled employee”); Taylor, 184 F.3d 296 at 314–15 
(holding that the employer’s duty to engage in the interactive process is triggered “[o]nce the 
employer knows of the disability and the employee’s desire for accommodations” and that the 
employer must “‘‘meet the employee half-way’” by requesting additional information); 
Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The employer has 
to meet the employee half-way, and if it appears that the employee may need an accommodation 
but doesn’t know how to ask for it, the employer should do what it can to help[.]”); Taylor v. 
Principal Fin. Group Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir.1996) (“Thus, it is the employee’s initial 
request for an accommodation which triggers the employer’s obligation to participate in the 
interactive process of determining one[.]”)).  But see Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 
(11th Cir. 1997) (holding that the plaintiff must produce evidence that a reasonable 
accommodation is available before an employer is obligated to engage in the interactive process). 
 243. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9; Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1114.  
 244. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1114–15. 
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An employer can demonstrate this good faith by pointing to cooperative 
actions taken to determine appropriate accommodations.245  These actions 
would include attempts to meet with the employee, discuss the employee’s 
limitations, ask what the employee specifically wants, consider the employee’s 
request, and offer and discuss available alternatives when the request is too 
burdensome.246 
Once the employer and employee have identified and assessed possible 
reasonable accommodations, legislative history instructs that “‘the expressed 
choice of the applicant shall be given primary consideration unless another 
effective accommodation exists that would provide a meaningful equal 
employment opportunity.’”247  An appropriate reasonable accommodation 
must effectively enable the employee to perform the duties of the position.248 
The interactive process requirement, at first glance, seems an eminently 
reasonable way to further the ADA’s goals from both the employee’s and 
employer’s viewpoints.  It certainly assists the disabled employee, in that it 
directs employers to cooperate with reasonable accommodation requests.  But 
it is also likely the best way for employers to avoid ADA liability and promote 
positive worker morale at the same time.  The interactive process helps an 
employer.  If an employee requests an accommodation, or an employer has 
reason to believe an employee is disabled and needs one, then the interactive 
process provides an opportunity for employers to initially assess an employee’s 
possible impairments and to consider if a reasonable accommodation is 
required.  If the employer in good faith determines that the employee is not 
disabled, the employer has absolved itself from ADA liability (or at the very 
 
 245. Id. at 1115.  Further, the employer need have little worry that a response to an 
accommodation request will legally establish that the employer regards the requesting employee 
as disabled under the ADA.  Courts have recognized that such a rule “would discourage the 
amicable resolution of numerous employment disputes and needlessly force parties into 
expensive and time consuming litigation.”  Williams, 380 F.3d at 776–77 n.20 (quoting Thonton 
v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2001), clarified in other respects, 
292 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002)); see Plant v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 938 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 246. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 115. 
 247. Id. at 1115 (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 35 (1989)). 
 248. Barnett, 288 F.3d at 1115.  At the litigation stage, for an employee to demonstrate than 
an employer breached its duty to provide reasonable accommodations because it failed to engage 
in good faith in the interactive process, the employee generally must establish: 
(1) the employer knew about the employee’s disability; 
(2) the employee requested accommodations or assistance for his or her disability; 
(3) the employer did not make a good faith effort to assist the employee in seeking 
accommodations; and 
(4) the employee could have been reasonably accommodated but for the employer’s lack 
of good faith. 
Williams, 380 F.3d at 771–72.  Thus, the disabled employee must show that a reasonable 
accommodation did exist and that it would have allowed continued employment if not for the 
employer’s actions.  See id. 
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least “regarded as” liability).  This promotes the ADA’s goals of fighting 
discrimination against truly disabled individuals, preventing adverse actions 
based on myths and stereotypes, and integrating the disabled into the 
workplace.249  In a more basic sense, it also will likely increase worker morale 
to know that employers will communicate and work with their impaired 
employees (current or prospective), not ignore them. 
Furthermore, the interactive process promotes the ADA’s goals without 
resorting to litigation.  As the Jacques opinion argued: “The focus of the 
interactive process . . . [is] that capable employees can remain employed if 
their medical problems can be accommodated, rather than on sounding a 
clarion call to legal troops to opine on whether the employee’s impairment is 
an actual disability within the legal nuances of the ADA.”250  It is a way for an 
employer to take early intervention, outside of the courtroom, for exploring 
accommodations for employees it suspects, or truly perceives, are disabled.251  
In this way, Jacques describes the process as “more of a labor tool than a legal 
tool” and as “a prophylactic means to guard against capable employees losing 
their jobs even if they are not actually disabled.”252  This last point is 
important.  The reality is that the ADA is not the “be-all and end-all” of the 
relationship between impaired employees and their employers.  If employers 
and impaired employees can structure environments that are seen as both 
suitable by the employee and reasonable by the employer, people with 
valuable skills and experience can work successfully without having to claim 
ADA protection.253 
As is apparent, the employer’s obligation to engage in the interactive 
process is certainly triggered as soon as the employer regards an employee as 
disabled.254  At that point, the employer must communicate with the employee 
and explore possible reasonable accommodations.255  The Eighth Circuit’s 
Weber v. Strippit ruling, however, directly contradicts this interactive 
requirement and thereby weakens it.  Under Weber, the employer who regards 
an employee disabled does not have to communicate or explore 
accommodation.  This employer faces no liability.  Of course, if the employee 
 
 249. See supra notes 44–53 and accompanying text. 
 250. Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 251. Id. at 170. 
 252. Id. 
 253. The Third Circuit in Taylor v. Phoenixville aptly summarized this reasoning: 
  [T]he interactive process can be thought of as a less formal, less costly form of 
mediation . . . . Mediated settlements . . . are cheaper than litigation, can help preserve 
confidentiality, allow the employee to stay on the job, and avoid monetary damages for an 
employer’s initially hostile responses to requests for accommodations.  The interactive 
process achieves these same goals even more effectively. 
Id. at 170 (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville, 184 F.3d 296, 316 n.6 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
 254. Id. at 169. 
 255. Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 169 (citing Taylor, 184 F.3d at 317). 
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turns out to be actually disabled, the employer is liable, but this will be 
determined in court only after costly litigation.  Weber’s ruling frustrates the 
utility of the interactive process as a labor tool. 
What is more, employers who refuse to interact with an employee who is 
regarded as disabled have acted from a discriminatory mindset.  They have 
rebuffed an employee who, for all they know, has an actual disability.  Failing 
to hold these employers liable pulls the teeth from the ADA’s express, and 
paramount, antidiscrimination function.256  The lower the liability an employer 
faces for discriminatory actions, the more likely this behavior will perpetuate, 
which will result in increased failures to accommodate actual disability.257  
Thus, the deterrent function of the “regarded as” provision is decreased by the 
Eighth Circuit’s ruling in Weber.  The Eighth Circuit did not address the 
deterrence issue, perhaps because it failed to address the interactive process 
requirement, as well. 
Although other circuits had recognized the interactive process prior to the 
Weber decision in 1999,258 the Eighth Circuit did not address it until less than a 
month after Weber, in Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.259  Fjellestad 
dealt solely with an “actual” disability claim but held that the interactive 
process is a requirement of the ADA.260  One wonders if Weber would have 
been decided differently if the Eighth Circuit’s recognition of the interactive 
process had occurred a month earlier.  Looking back at the case’s facts, the 
heart-disease-impaired plaintiff Weber appeared to request a delayed 
relocation to Akron, New York, based on a doctor’s advice, as a reasonable 
accommodation.261  Weber alleged that his employer Strippit regarded him as 
disabled when this request was made.262  Strippit fired Weber soon after the 
request.263  Weber could have offered an argument that Strippit refused to 
engage in an interactive process by failing to consider in good faith his request 
for delayed relocation and determine if it was truly reasonable and not an 
undue hardship.264  If Fjellestad’s ruling on the interactive process was already 
on the books, or if the Supreme Court had explicitly approved of the process, 
the Eighth Circuit would have had to address Weber’s argument and may have 
given more careful consideration to the reasonable accommodation issue. 
A factual analysis may have revealed that Strippit did not act in good faith 
towards Weber’s request.  Or it could have revealed that it did communicate 
 
 256. See supra notes 44–53 and accompanying text. 
 257. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 258. See supra note 242. 
 259. 188 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 260. Id. at 951–52. 
 261. See Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 910 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 262. See id. 
 263. See id. 
 264. See id. 
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and cooperate with Weber.  Or it could have shown that Weber’s request 
would have imposed an undue hardship on Strippit and that no other 
accommodation existed.  In essence, a factual analysis would have explored 
the true merits of Weber’s accommodation claim, and Strippit’s response, 
instead of summarily dismissing accommodation for perceived disabilities. 
In Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department, the 
interactive process could have allowed the plaintiff Williams to stay on the job.  
Williams alleged that PHA failed to accommodate by failing to engage in the 
interactive process, and the Third Circuit held that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact to his claim.265  Taking Williams’ allegations as true, if PHA had 
adequately responded to and considered his transfer request, the two parties 
may have arranged a mutually acceptable situation where Williams continued 
his employment—without resorting to litigation.  Failing to hold employers 
liable for refusing to consider such requests when they perceive a disability 
lessens the likelihood of this ideal outcome. 
The existence of the ADA’s interactive process requirement is the best 
argument for recognizing reasonable accommodation for perceived disabilities.  
Failing to hold employers liable when they refuse to interact with employees 
who are regarded as disabled frustrates the utility of the interactive process as a 
practical labor tool, alternative to litigation, deterrent of discrimination, and 
instrument of integration.266  When employers do not engage in the interactive 
process over reasonable accommodation with employees they regard as 
disabled, courts should hold these employers liable.  Any other approach 
contradicts the ADA’s express purposes of antidiscrimination and integration. 
B. Residual Discrimination and Hostile Work Environments 
One of the ADA’s stated goals is to eliminate discrimination against the 
disabled that is based on “stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the 
individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, 
 
 265. Williams, 380 F.3d at 776 n.19. 
 266. As the Ninth Circuit has well explained: 
  The interactive process is the key mechanism for facilitating the integration of 
disabled employees into the workplace.  Employers who reject this core process must face 
liability when a reasonable accommodation would have been possible.  Without the 
interactive process, many employees will be unable to identify effective reasonable 
accommodations.  Without the possibility of liability for failure to engage in the 
interactive process, employers would have less incentive to engage in a cooperative 
dialogue and to explore fully the existence and feasibility of reasonable accommodations.  
The result would be less accommodation and more litigation, as lawsuits become the only 
alternative for disabled employees seeking accommodation.  This is a long way from the 
framework of cooperative problem solving based on open and individualized exchange in 
the workplace that the ADA intended. 
Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1116, rev’d on other grounds, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
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society.”267  Congress included the “regarded as” definition of disability to 
acknowledge that “accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases 
are as handicapping as the physical limitations that flow from actual 
impairment.”268  When a disabled person is discriminated against in 
employment, termination or a missed raise may not be the only problem.  
Courts may be faced with an employer or entire workplace that has 
demonstrated deeply discriminatory attitudes toward an employee in the course 
of a tangible adverse employment action.  Even before a claim reaches the 
courtroom, employers may be faced with complaints from a disabled employee 
that his co-workers or superiors are exhibiting clearly discriminatory attitudes 
towards him. 
For example, a man named John gets a job at Salem Timber Mill 
(“Salem”).  John suffers from epilepsy and has had part of his brain removed 
and a metal plate inserted.  John initially does his job effectively, with no 
complaints about his performance from his supervisors.  However, John’s 
manager discovers John’s impairments over a lunchroom conversation.  John’s 
manager begins to call him names such as “platehead” and refers to him as 
“stupid” and “not playing with a full deck” because of his impairment and 
operation.  Other co-workers pick up on this and begin doing the same.  John’s 
epilepsy does not substantially limit him in a major life activity, but, as the 
comments indicate, John’s manager regards him as substantially limited in the 
major life activity of thinking.  Moreover, John’s ability to do his job begins to 
suffer heavily from the verbal abuse, and he no longer is able to effectively 
interact with his co-workers and do his job well.  John’s manager subsequently 
fires him based on his perception that John’s impairment makes him 
substantially impaired in his ability to think and work in the timber industry.269 
This example demonstrates that discriminatory attitudes, stereotypic 
assumptions, and accumulated myths and fears may truly turn an impairment 
into an ADA-protected disability.  John’s epilepsy and operation did not 
necessarily substantially limit him in anything until his co-workers and 
manager harassed and fired him.  Under the EEOC regulations three-part 
classification of those regarded as disabled, John would fall under “(2),” as an 
individual who “[h]as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
 
 267. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)–(3). 
 268. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 276–77 (1987). 
 269. This example has been adapted from the actual case of Shaver v. Independent Stave Co., 
350 F.3d 716, 719–21 (8th Cir. 2003), and a hypothetical scenario from Jacques.  See Jacques v. 
DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 167–68 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).  The major life activity of 
thinking has been judicially recognized.  Shaver, 350 F.3d at 720; see Brown v. Lester E. Cox 
Med. Ctrs, 286 F.3d 1040, 1044–45 (8th Cir. 2002).  For a review of the major life activity of 
working, see supra note 193. 
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major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such 
impairment.”270 
John will likely sue his employer Salem, and win, for firing him based on a 
perceived disability.  John, in this scenario, requests and receives reinstatement 
as a remedy for this discrimination.271  After losing the lawsuit, and upon 
John’s return to the job, Salem no longer officially regards John as disabled.  It 
is likely, though, that John will face “residual” (i.e. continuing) discrimination 
at the worksite based on his employer’s original misperceptions and its action 
against him.272  The Jacques opinion noted that it will not always be sufficient 
for employees to “merely disabuse their employers of their misperceptions.”273  
John’s situation is a clear example of this practical outlook.  It is unlikely that 
his lawsuit will be sufficient for John to disabuse his co-workers of their 
misperception of him as “stupid” or “not playing with a full deck.”  To the 
contrary, it may make them more hostile towards him because he sued Salem 
based on behavior in which they took part. 
The ADA provides a remedy for John’s dilemma in such a situation.  The 
ADA explicitly provides for reasonable accommodations such as “job 
restructuring,” “modified work schedules,” “reassignment,” “appropriate 
adjustment or modifications of . . . training materials or policies,” “and other 
similar accommodations.”274  A model reasonable accommodation request for 
John would probably first include asking his employers, upon his return to 
work, to implement sensitivity training for his harassing co-workers as to the 
true nature of his impairments.275  John could further request that, until this 
training was complete, his job at the mill be restructured, his schedule 
modified, or that he be transferred so that he could avoid the harassers during 
 
 270. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text. 
 271. The reality is that many employees would not want to return to such an employer, but 
some may want their jobs back for a variety of reasons.  Reinstatement is one form of equitable 
relief available under the ADA.  42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(g)(1) (2000).  The remedies available 
under the ADA are the same as those available for a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.  42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).  See infra notes 316–17 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of why certain remedies, like restatement, should only apply to plaintiffs facing hostile 
environments or residual discrimination. 
 272. The actual facts of Shaver indicate a very low possibility that John would return to 
Salem, but it could happen in another situation where a plaintiff seeks to retain his job after a 
successful “regarded as” claim. 
 273. Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 168 (internal quotation omitted). 
 274. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(b); Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 168; see supra note 130 and 
accompanying text. 
 275. See Moberly, supra note 101, at 637–38; Kent v. Derwinski, 790 F. Supp. 1032, 1040 
(E.D. Wash. 1991) (discussing sensitivity training as a possible accommodation for co-workers’ 
discriminatory attitudes directed toward a perceived disability); see also Unfair Advantage, supra 
note 101, at 999. 
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this time.  All three of these requests could easily be classified under the 
ADA’s explicit examples of reasonable accommodations.276 
When a court is considering factual variations of this scenario, as long as 
there is some connection between an employer’s actionable misperception and 
co-workers’ residual discriminatory attitudes, reasonable accommodations 
which address this residual discrimination should be recognized under the 
ADA.277  To determine if such accommodations would be appropriate for an 
employee regarded as disabled, a court could employ the EEOC’s three 
categories of perceived disabilities.278  The more an employee appears to fall 
under category “(2)” or “(3),” the more likely accommodations that attack 
residual discrimination will be proper.279  The more an employee seems to fall 
under “(1),” an individualized exaggeration of impairment, the less likely he 
will face residual prejudice that could be remedied by accommodations.  John, 
from the hypothetical above, would fall under “(2),” and would likely be 
served by accommodation to address post-lawsuit discrimination. 
 
 276. Commentator Michelle A. Travis agrees with this position, recognizing that the ADA’s 
accommodation requirement is broad enough to provide for these “non-traditional” 
accommodations in this context.  See Unfair Advantage, supra note 101, at 999–1002. 
 277. In this way, employers are still accommodating based on their misperception, as required 
by the ADA.  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 278. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text for the EEOC’s categories. 
 279. Commentator Michael D. Moberly has argued that only employees with physical or 
mental impairments are entitled to reasonable accommodations under the ADA, based on the 
statute defining “discrimination” as “not making reasonable accommodations to the known 
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.”  42 U.S.C. § 
12112(b)(5)(A); Moberly, supra note 101, at 635–36; see supra note 122 and accompanying text.  
Thus, a regarded as disabled employee would only be entitled to accommodations for residual 
discrimination if she actually has an impairment recognized under the ADA.  This argument is 
not entirely persuasive.  If Congress had wanted to limit accommodations in this way, it could 
have done so unambiguously by using the statutory term “impairments” instead of “limitations,” 
the term that it actually used.  Arguably, the term “limitations” is broad enough to encompass 
situations where a regarded as disabled employee has a physical or mental condition that does not 
rise to the level of an impairment.  For example, such a condition would be a “limitation” if it 
provokes a prejudicial reaction from people that adversely affects the employee’s ability to work.  
This interpretation may be a bit of a stretch, but it is not clearly contradictory of the statutory 
language and furthers Congress’s express intent of fighting the myths, fears, and stereotypes 
associated with disability.  While it would stretch the language of § 12112(b)(5)(A) to include an 
employee who has no physical or mental condition whatsoever, the types of discrimination 
prohibited under § 12112(b) are not necessarily the only types.  At least one court, in recognizing 
ADA hostile work environment claims, has held that § 12112(b)’s list is illustrative, not 
exhaustive, because it states that “the term ‘discriminate’ includes” the listed types.  Rohan v. 
Networks Presentation LLC, 192 F. Supp. 2d 434, 436 (D. Md. 2002).  Under this interpretation, 
a court could require that employers give accommodations to fight residual discrimination faced 
by formerly regarded as disabled employees without “physical or mental limitations.”  See 42 
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
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Granting these types of accommodations in certain situations before 
litigation, however, may be the best strategy for employers in the face of 
evolving ADA liability.  In the actual case of Shaver v. Independent Stave 
Co.,280 John Shaver (“John”) sued his employer Salem Wood Products 
Company (“Salem”) under the ADA, claiming that it subjected him to a hostile 
work environment through his co-workers’ harassment.281  While a hostile 
work environment claim is not specifically provided for in the ADA, the 
Eighth, Fifth, and Fourth Circuits have explicitly recognized the claim’s 
existence, and other courts have indicated that such a claim could be 
cognizable.282  The claim’s basis is found in the ADA’s prohibition against 
discrimination in regard to an employee’s “terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment.”283  This same phrase is used in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, and courts have recognized hostile work environment claims for co-
worker harassment under this language in the CRA since 1971.284  For an 
employee to have a viable hostile work environment claim under the ADA, the 
employee generally must establish that: 
(1) he has a disability under the ADA’s definition, 
(2) he was subject to unwelcome harassment, 
(3) the harassment was based on his disability, 
(4) the harassment was severe enough to affect a term, condition, or privilege 
of his employment, and 
(5) his employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to 
take prompt remedial action.285 
Thus, employees meeting the ADA’s disability definition may sue employers 
who subject them to disability-based harassment. 
In Shaver, the Eighth Circuit reversed a summary judgment against John 
Shaver, holding that a jury could determine that John’s co-workers regarded 
him as disabled and that Salem subjected him to a hostile work environment 
based on his co-workers’ harassing comments and behavior.286  If Salem had 
recognized that this harassment was taking place, or if John had requested 
accommodation during it, Salem may have been able to avoid liability under 
such a claim.  If Salem could establish that it had promptly provided 
 
 280. 350 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 281. Id. at 719. 
 282. Id.; see Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Serv. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 232–33 (5th Cir. 2001); 
Rohan, 192 F.Supp. 2d at 436. 
 283. Shaver, 350 F.3d at 720 (citing 42 U.S.C § 12112(a)). 
 284. Id. at 720 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). 
 285. See id.; Flowers, 247 F.3d at 235–36. 
 286. Shaver, 350 F.3d at 720–21. 
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accommodations such as sensitivity training along with a temporary 
modification of John’s schedule, it is unlikely that John could prove the fifth 
element of a hostile work environment claim (that the employer failed to take 
prompt remedial action).  Thus, providing these types of accommodations 
early will likely eliminate the threat of litigation and its corresponding burdens 
for employers. 
While providing these accommodations is surely a good preventive 
strategy in a hostile work environment situation, a tougher question is whether 
employers would be required by the ADA to make such accommodations in 
this setting.  The ADA compels an employer to accommodate disabled 
employees, including those who it regards as disabled.287  However, a hostile 
work environment scenario may only involve co-workers who regard a 
plaintiff as disabled, as in the actual Shaver case, while the employer itself has 
an accurate perception that the employee is not disabled.  The employer could 
argue that because it did not regard the plaintiff as disabled, it would not be 
required to accommodate.  An employee, though, could make a colorable 
argument that when co-worker harassment based on a perceived disability goes 
unaddressed by an employer, the employer itself is subjecting its employee to 
discrimination, based on a perceived disability, and affecting the conditions of 
employment.  Under this reasoning, an employee could potentially sue on a 
failure to accommodate theory in a perceived disability hostile work 
environment scenario.  This type of claim, to date, does not appear to have 
been tested in court;288 however, the specter of such a claim is at least another 
reason for employers to make affirmative good-faith efforts to eliminate 
workplace disability-based harassment by offering appropriate reasonable 
accommodations. 
Reasonable accommodations for employees like John, who face residual 
discrimination after successful “regarded as” claims or who face hostile work 
environments, would not be bizarre.  In fact, employers who provide such 
accommodations before litigation could safeguard themselves from hostile 
work environment liability.  A court should hold liable employers who 
unreasonably deny accommodations that could combat prejudicial attitudes.  
Otherwise, the disabling myths and stereotypes held anathema by the ADA 
will be allowed to continue unabated. 
C. Perceived Disabilities and the Direct Threat Defense 
The ADA provides that an employer may legally have a qualification 
standard requiring that a disabled employee not pose a “direct threat to the 
 
 287. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 288. As evidenced by a search on Westlaw of cases dealing with both ADA hostile work 
environment claims and reasonable accommodations. 
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health and safety of other individuals in the workplace.”289  The ADA defines 
“direct threat” as a “significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot 
be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.”290  The ADA’s legislative 
history indicates that this defense is a codification of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, which ordered a 
district court to determine whether a plaintiff’s contagious tuberculosis made 
her unqualified for the job under the Rehab Act.291  The Court indicated that 
the “duration and severity of Arline’s condition . . . [and] the probability that 
she would transmit the disease” were important factors in this determination.292  
The EEOC adopted and elaborated on this analysis in its ADA regulations, 
listing as critical factors in evaluating a direct threat: “(1) [t]he duration of the 
risk[,] (2) [t]he nature and severity of the potential harm[,] (3) [t]he likelihood 
that the potential harm will occur[,] and (4) [t]he imminence of the potential 
harm.”293 
The direct threat defense has repeatedly come up in the context of 
contagious disease.294  In addition to the Arline case, the Supreme Court dealt 
with a disability claim by an employee with a contagious disease in Bragdon v. 
Abbott.295  The HIV-infected plaintiff claimed she met the ADA’s disability 
definition, as either being “actually” or “regarded as” disabled.  Reasonable 
accommodation was an issue, but the Supreme Court deftly dodged it by ruling 
that the plaintiff’s HIV was a disability because it substantially limited her in 
the major life activity of reproduction.296  This type of ruling has ducked the 
reasonable accommodation issue along with other contagious diseases.  For 
example, when faced with actual and perceived disability claims by a hepatitis 
“C” infected employee, a Massachusetts District Court found that hepatitis “C” 
is an “actual” disability because it substantially limits the major life activities 
of reproduction and sexual relations.297 
Other contagious diseases may not so easily qualify as actual disabilities, 
however.  For instance, it would be much more difficult to argue that 
 
 289. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b); 1 PHELAN & ARTERTON, supra note 48, at 7–1. 
 290. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3); 1 PHELAN & ARTERTON, supra note 48, at 7–2. 
 291. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288–89; 1 PHELAN & ARTERTON, supra note 48, at 7–2. 
 292. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288; see 1 PHELAN & ARTERTON, supra note 48, at 7–2. 
 293. 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(r) (2004); 1 PHELAN & ARTERTON, supra note 48, at 7–2. 
 294. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 622, 649–52 (1998) (evaluating direct threat of 
employee with HIV); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1280–84 
(11th Cir. 2001) (evaluating direct threat of employee with HIV); Powell v. City of Pittsfield, 143 
F.Supp. 2d 94, 131–33 (D. Mass. 2001) (evaluating direct threat of employee with hepatitis “C”). 
 295. 524 U.S. at 624. 
 296. Id. at 640–42. 
 297. Powell v. City of Pittsfield, 221 F. Supp. 2d 119, 145–148 (D. Mass. 2002) (stating that, 
because of this ruling, it would be “superfluous to address plaintiff’s alternative argument that he 
was at any rate ‘regarded as’ having such an impairment”). 
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tuberculosis, or “TB,”298 would substantially limit reproductive or sexual 
activity.299  With such a disease, one that is contagious but does not 
substantially limit a major life activity, a plaintiff’s only chance for ADA 
protection is a “regarded as” or “record of” claim.  Imagine such a scenario: 
Jamie works as a receptionist at a real estate firm.  Jamie discovers that she has 
TB.  Jamie’s symptoms are controlled by prescribed drugs, but the risk of 
contagion exists.  Jamie tells a co-worker about her disease in confidence, but 
the co-worker tells their boss of Jamie’s TB.  The firm fires Jamie based on an 
incorrect perception that she is too sick to perform her job as receptionist. 
Jamie sues, claiming that her employer violated the ADA by firing her 
based on a disability.  Jamie claims that her TB is an “actual” disability or that 
her employer fired her because it regarded her as disabled.  A federal district 
court rules that Jamie’s TB is a physical impairment but, with its symptoms 
controlled by medication, it is one that does not substantially limit her in a 
major life activity.300  However, the court rules that Jamie’s firm did regard her 
TB as substantially limiting her in the major life activity of working.301  The 
firm then presents a direct threat defense.  It argues that, even assuming it 
believed that Jamie’s TB substantially limited her in a class of jobs in office 
work, her contagious impairment still posed a direct threat to the workplace.  
As part of this defense, the firm must establish that this threat of contagion 
could not have been “eliminated by reasonable accommodation.”302 
Jamie argues that she could have been reasonably accommodated by her 
wearing a mouth mask (similar to ones worn by surgeons) to prevent the risk 
 
 298. “TB is a disease caused by bacteria called Mycobacterium tuberculosis.”  DIVISION OF 
TUBERCULOSIS ELIMINATION: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT TB, at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/tb/faqs/qa_introduction.htm#Intro2.  “The bacteria can attack any part 
of your body, but they usually attack the lungs.”  Id.  “TB is spread through the air from one 
person to another.”  Id.  “The bacteria are put into the air when a person with TB disease of the 
lungs or throat coughs or sneezes.”  Id.  “People nearby may breathe in these bacteria and 
[become] infected.”  Id.  “People with TB are most likely to spread it to people they spend time 
with every day,” including family members, friends, and co-workers.  Id. 
 299. See Lester v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 95 C 2349, 1997 WL 417814, at *6–7 
(N.D. Ill. 1997).  In this case, the court heard an ADA disability claim based on symptomatic TB.  
Id.  The court determined that the plaintiff’s case was temporary, thus failing to establish that it 
substantially limited any of her life activities.  Id.  It is possible that a plaintiff could successfully 
argue that even asymptomatic tuberculosis could be transmitted via sexual activity, as plaintiffs 
have in regard to HIV and Hepatitis C, thus establishing an actual disability and dodging the 
thorny issue of reasonable accommodation for perceived disability.  This argument has not yet 
been made respecting TB and, in any case, may be less likely to succeed than a “regarded as” or 
“record of” claim with regard to this contagious disease. 
 300. See Lester for a similar ruling by a court presented with TB that was symptomatic.  1997 
WL 417814 at *6–7.  See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text for an explanation as to the 
ADA’s coverage regarding corrective measures like medication. 
 301. See supra note 193 for a run-down on the major life activity of working. 
 302. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (2000). 
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of contagion.  Alternatively, Jamie argues that the firm could have transferred 
her to a position as a clerk in their out-of-office file repository, in which she 
would not come in regular contact with co-workers or clients.  In this 
hypothetical, Jamie requested both of these accommodations before litigation, 
but the firm ignored her requests.  The court determines that these 
accommodations were reasonable under the facts. 
If a district court in the Eighth Circuit was hearing this case today, it would 
be presented with a dilemma.  Controlling precedent in the Eighth Circuit’s 
Weber v. Strippit, Inc. decision would dictate that regarded as disabled 
plaintiffs like Jamie are not entitled to reasonable accommodation, despite the 
plain language of the ADA’s disability definition.303  However, the language of 
the ADA’s direct threat defense explicitly necessitates a showing that a 
reasonable accommodation could not be given to Jamie.  Thus, Weber’s ruling 
contradicts the ADA’s plain language a second time. 
This hypothetical scenario demonstrates the weakness of Weber’s analysis 
in a practical way, as well.  Holding the firm liable for failing to consider 
Jamie’s requests for reasonable accommodation is not bizarre.  To the contrary, 
it is perfectly in line with the ADA’s purpose.  The firm refused to engage in 
the interactive process regarding a reasonable accommodation, which in fact 
existed, for an impairment it perceived as disabling.  The firm should be held 
liable for a discriminatory action taken against an employee it thought was 
disabled.  With regard to Jamie, if the firm had perceived her TB correctly, or 
had considered her requests, she likely would have retained her job.  On this 
basis, Jamie is “entitled” to the compensation she would receive as a result of a 
court holding her employer liable for its actions. 
The Third Circuit’s Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police 
Department case presents a scenario similar to the preceding hypothetical, this 
time dealing with an impairment other than contagious disease.  The Third 
Circuit pointed out, in a footnote, that PHA could have offered a defense that 
Williams’ psychological disorder constituted a direct threat to others and that 
no reasonable accommodation existed.304  The court also stated that this issue 
would have been left to a jury, in that PHA’s refusal to allow Williams to work 
near armed personnel was contradicted by its own psychologist.305 
Perhaps PHA did not make this defense because it wanted to keep the 
burden of proving that the radio room assignment was a reasonable 
accommodation on Williams,306 or because using the defense would have 
 
 303. See supra notes 156, 169–70 and accompanying text. 
 304. 380 F.3d 751, 770 n.15 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 305. Id. at 771 n.15. 
 306. Although the direct threat defense is termed a “defense,” which usually indicates that a 
defendant has the burden of proof, the issue of where the burden of proof actually lies with this 
ADA provision has created a circuit split.  See McKenzie v. Benton, 388 F.3d 1342, 1353–54 
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clearly necessitated litigation of the accommodation issue.307  Regardless, the 
easy application of the direct threat defense in this situation reinforces the 
ADA’s intention of applying reasonable accommodation to the “regarded as” 
context.308  If PHA had utilized a direct threat defense here, it would certainly 
have had to argue that no accommodation existed for Williams’ disability, 
actual or perceived.309 
The ADA requires that employers show that reasonable accommodations 
could not have been provided in order to argue a direct threat defense in a 
perceived disability context.  This is most easily demonstrated with contagious 
disease, but is true in any direct threat scenario.  A court must evaluate whether 
reasonable accommodation would have been appropriate in these claims and 
should not simply rule that accommodation is bizarre for all perceived 
disabilities. 
D. Windfalls, Dignitary Interests, and Private Attorneys General 
Probably the most difficult problem presented by the recognition of 
reasonable accommodation for the regarded as disabled is the “windfall 
theory” posed by the Eighth Circuit in Weber v. Strippit, Inc.310  The theory 
essentially asserts that it would be bizarre for an employer, disabused of its 
 
(10th Cir. 2004) (citing Borgialli v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 235 F.3d 1284, 1291–94 (10th Cir. 
2000)). 
 307. This artful dodge tactic may be a reason why this particular issue has not been dealt with 
directly in a case thus far. 
 308. The interplay between the provisions here, and the fact that the defense sprung from the 
Arline decision, demonstrates that direct threat is really just a formalized way for a defendant to 
establish that no reasonable accommodation exists for a plaintiff’s disability.  The ADA ensures 
that, if an employer takes an action against an employee based on a threat to workplace safety, it 
must do so based on a factual, reasonable medical judgment that no reasonable accommodation 
can alleviate the threat.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2004); 1 PHELAN & ARTERTON, supra note 
48 at 7-13. 
 309. One observes that PHA, despite its tactic, still was forced by the Third Circuit to litigate 
the accommodation issue with respect to its erroneous perception of Williams’ impairment.  See 
supra notes 206–31 and accompanying text.  Also of note, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in 
McKenzie v. Dovala approved a “regarded as” claim to go to a jury on a reasonable 
accommodation argument involving a direct threat scenario. 242 F.3d at 973–76.  In the case, 
McKenzie sued her employer, the Natrona County Sheriff’s Department, for failing to rehire her 
because it regarded her as psychologically disabled.  Id. at 969.  While the sheriff’s department 
did not directly claim direct threat at the summary judgment stage, the court discussed the defense 
and held that a jury should decide whether another position existed where McKenzie could have 
been reasonably accommodated and did not pose a threat.  Id. at 974–76. This factual scenario is 
remarkably similar to that in Williams—a mentally impaired peace officer claiming that another 
position could have accommodated a perceived disability.  In both cases, the courts determined 
that a jury should decide the interrelated issues of accommodation and direct threat.  Both cases 
thus further reinforce the argument that employers should be held liable for refusing to consider 
reasonable accommodation for regarded as disabled employees. 
 310. 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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incorrect perception, to have to reasonably accommodate an employee who is 
admittedly non-disabled.  This would create a windfall for regarded as disabled 
employees in that they would be entitled to accommodations that an employee 
with the same impairment(s), but not perceived as disabled, would not get.  In 
this way, a literal reading of the ADA’s statutory text would, in a sense, 
discriminate between similarly impaired (or “situated” as Weber labels) 
employees.  While one is accommodated, the other is not and may even be 
fired—with no recourse through the ADA.  As the argument goes, such a 
discriminatory result could not have been contemplated by Congress in passing 
the ADA.311 
While this windfall theory has some immediate appeal, it rests largely on a 
questionable assumption.  The theory argues that accommodation should not 
be recognized because an employer, once realizing that an employee is not 
disabled, may lawfully fire such an employee that is not disabled, who it does 
not regard as disabled, or who does not have a record of disability.  It is true 
that an employee must meet one of the three prongs of the ADA’s disability 
definition to receive the statute’s protection.  However, the dire consequence of 
this argument—termination—relies on the assumption that the employer’s 
desire to fire, or otherwise adversely act against, the employee is unrelated to 
its perception of the employee’s impairment.  While the Eighth Circuit in 
Weber considers the regarded as disabled employee and the non-disabled 
employee to be similarly situated, the Third Circuit in Williams v. Philadelphia 
Housing Authority Police Department recognizes that this is not necessarily 
so.312  Williams’s argument, more practically, reflects the probability that many 
adverse employment actions actually hinge on the employer’s perception that 
the employee cannot perform her job based on disability. 
For example, if PHA had wanted to fire Williams despite an accurate 
perception that Williams could work in the radio room, it could have done so 
without incurring ADA liability.  However, it is more likely that PHA, in 
seeking to retain a worker with substantial training and time on its police force 
(twenty-four years to be exact),313 would have assigned Williams to the radio 
room had it not inaccurately perceived Williams’ limitations to be greater than 
they actually were.  Had PHA better investigated a possible accommodation in 
the radio room, it may have discovered that Williams’ impairment did not limit 
him from radio room duty, and thus was not disabling.  PHA would have likely 
then accepted Williams’ request to work in the radio room.  None of this 
happened because PHA failed to consider the requested accommodation. 
Thus, the argument in both Williams and the New York District Court’s 
Jacques opinion that those regarded as disabled are not “similarly situated” 
 
 311. Id. 
 312. See supra notes 227–28 and accompanying text. 
 313. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 776 (3d. Cir. 2004). 
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with other impaired employees—rather, the perceived disability actually places 
them in a distinctly dissimilar position—is more convincing than Weber’s 
contrary reasoning.314  Indeed, when an employer acts adversely towards a 
regarded as disabled employee (such as by refusing to consider 
accommodation and then terminating the employee), the perceived disability 
places the employee at a disadvantage to those impaired but not regarded as 
disabled.  The Third Circuit demonstrated the soundness of this reasoning with 
a simple statement: “The employee whose limitations are perceived accurately 
gets to work, while Williams is sent home unpaid.”315 
What is gained from this discussion is that reasonable accommodation 
should be recognized to the extent that it can place, or would have placed, the 
“regarded as” disabled employee in an equal position to other employees—
thereby eliminating discrimination.316  “Windfalls” would not occur in these 
situations.  Moreover, holding employers liable for refusing to consider 
accommodations in good faith will likely result in qualified employees like 
Williams being able to keep their jobs in the first place, instead of having to 
resort to costly litigation. 
It is where employers would be forced to give operational accommodations 
to employees they no longer perceive as disabled that reasonable 
accommodation should not be recognized.  This is where the windfall theory 
holds water.  One result implicated by the windfall theory that would be 
“bizarre” would be forcing an employer to rehire a formerly regarded as 
disabled employee and then to give this employee operational, or “traditional,” 
accommodations.317  This approach would handcuff employers and would 
place formerly regarded as disabled employees in better positions than other 
employees.318  Once an employer no longer technically regards an employee as 
 
 314. See Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 315. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 775–76. 
 316. For example, providing sensitivity training for harassing co-workers would simply place 
the regarded as disabled employee back in the position she would have been if not for her co-
workers’ misperception and harassment.  See Unfair Advantage, supra note 101, at 999 
(recognizing that accommodations for residual discrimination would allow “perceived disability 
plaintiffs to achieve the position in which they would have been absent the mistaken beliefs”). 
 317. See supra note 124 and accompanying text for a discussion of these types of 
accommodations. 
 318. The ADA only restricts employers from taking adverse employment actions against 
those employees qualifying as “disabled.”  This is the statute’s antidiscrimination focus.  Any 
employee who does not meet one of the three prongs can be fired based on their non-disabling 
impairments, and it is not considered ADA discrimination.  If a court would force an employer to 
rehire and then provide operational accommodations to an employee who no longer meets the 
disability discrimination, the court has exceeded the ADA’s reach.  This would be a bizarre result, 
one that Weber warned against and Williams acknowledged might exist.  Giving remedies such as 
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, and front pay to perceived disability plaintiffs who need 
traditional forms of accommodations, as commentator Michelle Travis has noted, would move 
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disabled, the only accommodations that should affirmatively be provided are 
ones that will help dispel residual discrimination, as discussed above.  
Providing operational accommodations that directly address physical or mental 
impairments which are not actually disabling should not be required by the 
courts. 
These accommodations, including the physical restructuring of the 
workplace (by providing a more comfortable seat for someone with a 
degenerative back condition, for example), the restructuring of job tasks (by 
assigning some lesser tasks to a co-worker of someone physically incapable of 
doing them), and the restructuring of a work schedule (by giving longer breaks 
for a person suffering from exhaustion) are not required to remedy the myths, 
stereotypes, and prejudices that the “regarded as” provision was meant to 
attack.  In Weber, for example, even if the defendant Strippit was found liable 
for not accommodating by failing to engage in the interactive process, it should 
not have then been forced to rehire Weber and delay his relocation.319  Because 
such remedies do not address employer misperceptions, they would not be 
fighting disability discrimination.  Faced with an employee no longer regarded 
as disabled, Strippit should be able to exercise its prerogative as an employer 
and fire or refuse to hire Weber based on his non-disabling impairment, or any 
other legal reason. 
The final thrust of the windfall argument, though, goes too far.  The 
windfall theory further asserts reasonable accommodations should be denied 
here because even compensatory damages will place regarded as disabled 
employees in an unfairly advantageous position.320  It has already been argued 
that these employees, such as Williams, are not inherently similarly situated 
and that they do suffer harm that can be directly attributed to a failure to 
accommodate.  But, irrespective of any personal claim-of-right that a regarded 
as disabled employee has to compensation, there are two further reasons to 
permit these supposed “financial windfalls.” 
 
past the ADA’s goal of equal opportunity and give advantages to employees simply because they 
were once regarded as disabled.  Unfair Advantage, supra note 101, at 1001–03.  Travis has aptly 
analogized such a situation to the Supreme Court’s “after-acquired evidence” rule.  Id. at 1003–04 
(citing McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 355–56 (1995)).  This rule 
applies when an employer takes an adverse employment action based on an employee’s protected 
status, but the employer later discovers a proper reason for the action.  Id. at 1004.  In order to 
condemn the initial discriminatory mindset, the rule allows plaintiffs to state a discrimination 
claim, but forecloses reinstatement as a remedy.  Id.  This rule upholds the deterrent function of 
discrimination statutes while at the same time allowing employers to exercise “other prerogatives 
and discretions in the course of the hiring, promoting, and discharging of their employees.”  Id. 
(quoting McKennon, 513 U.S. at 361). 
 319. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 320. See Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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The 2003 case of Shaver v. Independent Stave Co., an Eighth Circuit case 
discussed earlier in Section B of this Part,321 recognized that “the mere fact of 
discrimination offends the dignitary interest” that the ADA was designed to 
protect.322  The plaintiff John Shaver argued that his employer Salem retaliated 
against him for making his hostile work environment claim.323  In seeking new 
employment after being fired by Salem, John named his former supervisor as a 
reference.324  The supervisor told prospective employers that he could not 
recommend John because John had “a get rich quick scheme involving suing 
companies.”325  The District Court held that John tried to manufacture a 
retaliation claim by naming the supervisor as a reference and dismissed the 
claim on this basis.326  The Eighth Circuit overruled the District Court, 
analogizing John’s claim to that of “tester” cases under the CRA.327  In these 
“tester” cases, the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit upheld claims where 
minority applicants applied for jobs or housing, that they had no intention of 
accepting, for the sole purpose of determining whether the employer or 
landlord was unlawfully discriminating.328 
The courts advanced two reasons for allowing tester cases.329  One was that 
discrimination offends a dignitary interest that the CRA was designed to 
protect, “regardless of whether the discrimination worked any direct economic 
harm to the plaintiffs.”330  The Shaver court, citing the ADA’s express 
antidiscrimination purpose331 as support, held that the ADA has a dignitary 
interest that must be protected irrespective of a plaintiff’s level of economic 
harm.332  The second rationale behind the tester cases is that such individuals 
serve the role of “private attorneys general” in attacking activity illegal under 
the CRA.333  The Eighth Circuit saw a similar function served by John in his 
ADA retaliation claim.334  Congress gave the possibility of compensatory 
damages to John and others like him in order to “enlist[] private self-interest in 
the enforcement of public policy.”335 
 
 321. See supra notes 269, 280–81, 286 and accompanying text. 
 322. 350 F.3d 716, 724 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 323. Id. at 723. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Shaver, 350 F.3d at 723–24. 
 328. Id. at 724 (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982); Kyles v. J.K. 
Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. (citing Kyles, 222 F.3d at 297). 
 331. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. 
 332. Shaver, 350 F.3d at 724. 
 333. Id. at 724–25. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. 
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Both of these rationales apply here.  By allowing regarded as disabled 
employees to seek and receive compensatory damages where employers fail to 
accommodate (either by refusing to interact or by refusing residual 
discrimination accommodation), Congress intended to enlist private attorneys 
general to protect the nondiscriminatory dignitary interest inherent in the 
ADA.336  In this way, disability-based discrimination is punished and the 
deterrent value of the ADA is increased by recognizing reasonable 
accommodation for the regarded as disabled.  So, this recognition is not a 
“windfall” that should be discouraged.  It is in line with a recognized 
jurisprudence of antidiscrimination, harnessed by Congress in writing the 
ADA. 
The windfall theory is not completely flawed—operational 
accommodations (and associated remedies) are windfalls that should not be 
given in this context.  The problem with Weber’s understanding of the windfall 
theory is that it takes the proposition too far, swallowing up the ADA’s 
intended function of attacking all disability-based discrimination and neutering 
the “regarded as” provision’s specific function of fighting myths, stereotypes, 
and prejudices.  Therefore, while courts should not force employers to rehire 
regarded as disabled employees in need of operational accommodations, courts 
should (1) attack disability discrimination, preserve the integrity of the ADA, 
and encourage non-litigious dispute resolution by holding employers liable for 
failing to accommodate perceived disabilities and (2) require reasonable 
accommodations to combat residual discrimination. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Recognizing reasonable accommodation for perceived disabilities under 
certain conditions is consistent with a practical view of the employer–
employee relationship and is essential to further the ADA’s goal of 
nondiscrimination.  While the judicial debate thus far has explored the central 
arguments on both sides of this issue, it really has only touched the tip of . . . 
well, maybe not an iceberg.  However, issues relating to this dispute clearly 
have implications for the continuing importance and viability of the ADA.  
Properly adjudicating reasonable accommodation claims by those regarded as 
disabled will help ensure that the ADA continues its goals of prohibiting 
discrimination and providing equal opportunity to the disabled without creating 
inequalities or overburdening employers.  On this immense statute’s fifteenth 
anniversary, an in-depth analysis of a seemingly small issue such as this one 
 
 336. See Vande Walle, supra note 53, at 931–34, for a common-sense reason for holding 
employers liable under the “regarded as” provision.  (asking: “Why should we shield the 
employer from liability just because of her lucky mistake when she is engaging in exactly the 
kind of behavior prohibited by the statute?”). 
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may remind the judicial system, and perhaps all Americans, what the ADA 
was, is, and should be to our society. 
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